Revealed preference, consumer demand and aggregate demand. by Lee, Man-Ho. & Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Economics.
Revealed Preference, Consumer Demand 




Professor Kam-Chau Wong 
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Philosophy 
in 
Economics 
© T h e Chinese University of Hong Kong 
May 2002 
The Chinese University of Hong Kong holds the copyright of this thesis. Any person(s) 
intending to use a part or whole of the materials in the thesis in a proposed publication 
must check copyright release from the Dean of the Graduate School. 
b f 1 ] B ffl^i 
N^NaiBRARY S Y S T E M / ^ 
Abstract 
This thesis provides revealed preferences analysis for consumer demands and aggregate 
demands. Two main issues are: 
1) Revealed Preference, DifFerentiable Demand, and Expenditure Function. 
(Ch. 2) 
We deal with the construction of a smooth consumer demand function which ratio-
nalizes a given set of observed price-purchase data. We will prove that a finite set of 
price-purchase data satisfies the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preferences (SARP) if and only 
if it is rationalizable by a continuous, strictly monotone and strictly concave utility function 
which generates a smooth demand function. Our proof uses a new method: we will first 
construct a smooth expenditure function rationalizing the data, and then use this expendi-
ture function to construct the demand function and the utility function. To ensure that the 
utility function satisfies the desired properties, we have developed a new condition (eventual 
constancy) on the expenditure function. 
2) Excess Demand and Homothetic Economy. (Ch. 3, 4) 
We deal with the construction of an economy composed of agents with homothetic 
preferences which is consistent with a given set of observed data about price and quantities 
of excess demand. We will show that given a finite set of such excess demand data, we could 
construct an underlying economy with individuals having homothetic preferences. We will 
also show that if the set of excess demand data is not finite, then in general this could not 
be done. We will use a new method to decompose the economy excess demand data into 
individual excess demand data, and then find endowments for each individual such that 
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Chapter 1 
The Literature Review 
The concepts of utility and demand have a long history. At the beginning they were 
treated as two separate ideas, only at the nineteenth century was a bridge between them 
established. 
The notion of utility is originated from the distinction between "value in use" and "value 
in exchange" • This distinction was treated by various authors since the time of Aristotle 
and was made famous by Adam Smith in 1776 (cf. Smith 1880) through the diamond-water 
example: diamonds are expensive though they are of little practical use, but water is cheap 
though it is a necessity of life. The idea that usefulness is not necessarily reflected in price 
is also observed by Danvanzati (1588) and Law (1705) (cf. Law 1966). Thus at that time, 
"utility" meant "value in use". 
The idea of diminishing marginal utility could be traced back to Bernoulli (1738), Ben-
tham {1789, 1802) (cf. Bentham 1948), and Marshall (1890) (cf. Marshall 1982). Bernoulli 
used the idea of diminishing marginal utility to resolve the St. Petersburg paradox: Person 
A tosses a fair coin repeatedly until a head appears, if the head appears after n tosses he 
pays a sum $2""^ to Person B. Person B's expected winning is infinite in this game. The 
paradox arises because it is clearly not necessary for Person B to bribe Person A with such 
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a large amount to induce him to play. Bernoulli's solution was to compute expected util-
ity rather than expected winnings. Under the assumption of diminishing marginal utility, 
the bribe became a reasonable number. Bentham originally used the concept of utility to 
rationalize the civil and criminal codes of law, but a subsequent application dealt with the 
distribution of wealth: transfering a small sum of money from a rich man to a poor man 
would lower the rich man's happiness by a lesser extent than the increase in the poor man's 
happiness. This argument demonstrates the idea of marginal utility and that it diminishes. 
Cardinality of utility was not seriously questioned until Edgeworth (1881) (cf. Edge-
worth 1967)，who expressed utility as a function of quantities of all commodities and intro-
duced the indifference curve, which could be used to dispose the cardinality requirement of 
utility. 
The concept of demand, according to Katzner (1970), dates back to King in 1696, 
who computed a demand schedule for wheat. The inverse relationship between price and 
quantity was then known as King's Law. Verri (1760), Cournot (1838) (cf. Coumot 1960) 
and Eiigel (1857) later on gave formulations of the demand. The locus of the consumption 
bundle for fixed prices and variable income is now known as the Engel curve. 
The first one who attempted to bridge the gap between utility and demand was perhaps 
Jevons (1871), and Walras (1874) was the first to succeed. From utility maximization Walras 
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derived demand as a function of all prices and initial endowment. His work was followed by-
Marshall (1890), Pareto (1892) and Johnson (1913). Finally Slutsky (1915) brilliantly put 
all these pieces together, transforming "classical" demand theory into what it is today. 
So far the theories are based on preference relations and utility functions, these, how-
ever, are not observable. One would say that we should not introduce to our theories 
concepts which do not lend themselves to objective observation. It is not possible for us 
to carry out experiments necessary for effective observation of consumer preferences. On 
the other hand, there is no difficulty in observing a consumer's actual choices, every day 
the consumer reveals his preferences to us through his choices. Samuelson (1947) there-
fore suggested that the theory be established directly on the basis of the consumer demand 
function. 
This direction of consumer theory could be traced back to Antonelli (1886)，who, in 
contrast to Walras who constructed demand from utility, ran from the reverse direction and 
examined the construction of indifference curves from demand. His technique dealt with 
differentiable demand function, and integrated a system of marginal rates of substitution 
derived from the inverses of the demand functions. Samuelson (1950) supplied a more 
complete and explicit exposition of the problem. His approach was to derive the demand-
price functions (the inverses of the demands) from the demand-quantity functions (the given 
demand function), and then from the demand-price function derive the utility function. This 
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approach was refined by Hurwicz and Uzawa (1971) by doing integration directly over the 
give demand functions rather than their inverses. This integrability approach obtains utility 
function with a duality method: first construct the expenditure function from the demand 
function and then recover the utility function from the expenditure function. (Such dual 
argument will also be applied in this thesis in chapter 2.) The integrability problem was 
also studied in various ways in Houthakker (1950) and Uzawa (1960). 
Samuelson (1947) also introduced the approach of revealed preferences. A bundle of 
goods A is revealed preferred to another bundle of goods B if both bundles are affordable but 
bundle A is chosen. He also introduced the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) 
so that these revealed preferences relations are not mutually contradictory (symmetric). 
The gap between the revealed preference based theory and the utility based theory was 
narrowed by Houthakker (1950), who introduced the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference 
(SARP) which requires that revealed preferences be acyclic. By integrating a system of 
partial differential equations, he showed that the Strong Axiom is not only necessary, but 
also sufficient for a given different!able demand function to be induced by an underlying 
preference. Richter (1966) extended this by dropping the differentiability assumptions on 
demands, since he replaced the method of integration by a general tool of set theory known 
as the Zorn's Lemma. 
A third approach was provided by Afriat (1967) which based on linear programming 
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techniques. Motivated by applications for empirical tests, Afriat (1967) focused on a finite 
case: a finite set of data of demand (price purchase) observations. He showed that the 
revealed preference problem can be translated into a finite system of linear inequalities, and 
the Strong Axiom allows the existence of an underlying utility generator. 
Similar results were also obtained by Matzkin and Richter (1991), who also pointed 
out that the utility generator can be constructed to be generic ally smooth. To obtain not 
only a generically smooth, but also a smooth utility generator, Chiappori and Rochet (1987) 
extended the Strong Axiom to the Strong Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SSARP) 
which requires, in addition to the Strong Axiom, that the demand is invertible. They showed 
that this Strong Strong Axiom, for a finite set of demand data, is necessary and sufficient 
for the existence of a utility generator that is smooth and also strictly concave. 
Chapter 2 of this thesis works through a similar line of Afriat (1967), Matzkin and 
Richter (1991), Chiappori and Rochet (1987). We will show that under the Strong Axiom 
of Revealed Preference and with finite demand data, the utility generator could be taken 
as continuous, strictly monotone, strictly concave, and that generates a demand function 
that is smooth. Matzkin and Richter (1991) could not obtain a smooth demand function, 
but only one that is generically smooth. Chiappori and Rochet (1987) ensured a smooth 
demand function only by extending the Strong Axiom to the Strong Strong Axiom, thus 
yielding not only a smooth demand function but also a smooth utility function. 
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In addition to concavity and smoothness, homotheticity could be another restriction 
that economists often impose on the utility functions. In demand theory, linear income ex-
pansion paths are generated by Nomothetic preferences. Antonelli (18S6), Chipman (1970) 
and Gorman (1953) studied aggregation problems under the assumption of homothetic pref-
erences. Homotheticity of preferences is also assumed in certain important works of price 
and quantity indexes such as Diewert (1993). Trade theory is another area in which homo-
thetic preferences appear (cf. Chipman (1965, 1974)). This concept is also widely used in 
empirical econometrics (cf. Diewert (1993), Mas-Colell et al. (1995)). 
Chipman (1974) showed that a demand data satisfying both the Strong Axiom and 
differentiability could be induced by homothetic preferences. His technique is to use integra-
bility methods and so differentiability of data is necessary. Varian (1983) obtained piecewise 
linear homothetic preferences, but could only rationalize the data in a, much weaker sense 
that the demand generated by the preference need not coincide precisely with the data. 
Liu and Wong (2000) gave a complete characterization of demand generated by homothetic 
preferences by the introduction of the Strong Axiom of Revealed Homothetic Preferences 
(SHA), which is, in some sense, the "homothetic closure" of the standard Houthakker's 
Strong Axiom. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis integrated the ideas of Chiappori and Rochet (1987) and Liu 
and Wong (2000) by introducing a new axiom called Strong Strong Axiom of Revealed 
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Homothetic Preferences (SSHA), which combines the Strong Strong Axiom (cf. Chiappori 
and Rochet (1987)) and the Strong Homothetic Axiom (cf. Liu and Wong (2000)). Our 
result shows that a finite demand data set satisfying SSHA is rationalizable by a utility 
function that is not only homothetic but also smooth. Thus the results of Chiappori and 
Rochet (1987) and Liu and Wong (2000) are combined. 
Chapters 2 and 3 concerns rationalization for data of individual demand observations. 
Chapter 4 concerns rationalization for data of an economy's aggregate excess demand ob-
servations. The Strong Strong Axiom of Revealed Homothetic Preferences introduced in 
chapter 3 was used to analyze the underlying economy of a given excess demand function. 
(As is standard, an excess demand function is the sum of all individual excess demands of 
the agents in the economy.) The problem of whether a given excess demand function is gen-
erated by an economy was first studied by Sonnenschein (1972, 1973). Mantel (1974) proved 
that when the excess demand function is defined on compact subsets of positive prices, any 
continuously diflferentiable excess demand function for I commodities is a market demand 
function of an economy with 21 agents. His result was strengthened by Debreu (1974) who 
required only I agents and continuity of excess demand. Problems of a similar kind were 
also treated by Mas-Colell (1977) and McFadden et al. (1974). 
Mantel (1976) allowed the underlying economy to be composed of I agents with ho-
mothetic preferences by restricting the class of excess demand functions to have bounded 
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second order partial derivatives. In chapter 4 we provide a view into the finite case, and 
show that not only homotheticity, but also smoothness of utility functions of agents could be 
achieved. We will also prove that for the infinite case, homotheticity of agents could not be 
guaranteed in general. The condition that excess demand functions have bounded second 
order partial derivatives in Mantel (1976) is a sufficient condition for the excess demand 
function to be generated by an economy with agents having homothetic preferences. But 
it is stronger than necessary. We conjecture that the Lipchitz assumption on the excess 
demand function is the "appropriation" ’ and we obtain a positive result for the special case 
of two commodities. The general necessary and sufficient condition for an excess demand 
function to be rationalized by economies composed of agents with homothetic preferences 
still remains an open problem. 
We conclude this thesis in Chapter 5 by summarizing our main theorems. 
In the Appendix, we discuss several computer programs for checking the Strong Axiom 
of Revealed Preference on a finite data set. 
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Chapter 2 
Revealed Preference, DifFerentiable Demand, and Expenditure 
Function 
I. Introduction 
Economists-both applied and theoretical—often assume that a consumer has a differ-
entiable (or even infinitely differentiable) demand function. What restrictions does this 
assumption impose on a finite set of observed consumption-purchase data? In this paper, 
we provide a complete answer: we need the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP) 
and nothing more.^ 
One might think that the question of characterizing observations from differentiable 
demand has been settled by previous work (e.g. Chiappori and Rochet 1987, Matzkin and 
Richter 1991); but this is not true. In fact, Matzkin and Richter (1991) only showed that 
the SARP ensures existence of a strictly concave utility function that generates a not-
necessarily-difFerentiable demand function. However, in general their demand function is 
not differentiable, but only generically differentiable (see Remark 2 below). Chiappori and 
Rochet (1987) obtained^ an infinitely differentiable demand function only for the special 
1 Obviously, for an infinite set of data, the S A R P is not sufficient for yielding a differentiable demand 
function; e.g. it is easy to find an (infinite) countable set of demand data which extends uniquely to a 
continuous but not differentiable demand function. 
2 T h e y also obtained an infinitely differentiable utility function. 
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case, where they strengthened the SARP by adding the invertibility requiremeut for the 
demand data (see Remark 3 below). Our theorem sharpens these results, showing that the 
SARP alone is sufficient to ensure existence of a utility function whose demand function 
is difFerentiable everywhere (not just generically differentiable); and we don't need any 
additional assumption (such as invertibility) on the data.^ 
To construct a utility function, we do not use a direct construction with linear inequal-
ities (e.g. Afriat 1967), but use an indirect approach with duality arguments (cf. Hurwicz 
and Uzawa 1971). We first construct an infinitely difFerentiable expenditure function, and 
we then construct a continuous direct utility from the expenditure function. (The smooth-
ness of the expenditure function ensures that the demand function is also smooth.) Our 
utility construction works for a wide class of expenditure functions satisfying a condition of 
"eventual constancy." That condition has a clear economic interpretation; and technically 
it ensures that the indifference curves of the constructed preference behave nicely at the 
boundary of the non-negative orthant of commodity (Euclidean) space (cf. Remarks 7 and 
8 below). This condition also covers situations where previous results fail (cf. Remark 6 
below, and cf. Blackorby and Diewert 1979). 
Our work has interesting implications. Our main theorem shows that from an empir-
3 Without invertibility, our utility function need not be infinitely differentiable, cf. Chiappori and Rochet 
(1987) . 
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ical viewpoint, the "non-parametric approach" (revealed preference) is totally equivalent 
to the "parametric approach" 一 the approach that exhibits an infinitely differentiable de-
mand function coinciding with the data (cf. Chiappori and Rochet 1987, p. 687). Thus 
one can use differentiable demand functions and differentiable expenditure functions to do 
differentiable economic analysis,^ without worrying about whether the utility functions are 
differentiable? Our theorem can also be applied to the study of testable equilibrium theory 
(cf. Matzkin and Brown, 1996), yielding economies with consumers whose demand functions 
are differentiable.® 
^ E.g. comparative statics (cf. Varian 1984, pp. 5 -8) , differentiable general equilibrium (cf. Mas-Colell 
1985), welfare analysis (cf. Mas-Colell et al. 1995, pp. 80 -91) . 
5 In fact, there are many differentiable demand functions whose utility functions are non-differentiable, 
including ail those differentiable demand functions that are not invertible. T h u s we can consider a differen-
tiable demand function that chooses the same bundle at two different price vectors (with different relative 
prices). 
6 Also, our duality result (Proposition 2) is also a general tool for application in production theory; 
cf. Footnote 21 below. 
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II. Results 
The commodity space is the price space is the price-income space is V = 
沢!)_+ X JR++. 7 A budget set is a set B{p, w) = {.-c G iR^ : p - x < w;}，where (p, w) G V. 
八 八 
I A 
Fig la . Budget set in 2-dimensional space Fig lb . Budget set in 3-dimensional space 
A utility function is a function U : JR. For any function h : V we say h 
is generated (rationalized) by a utility function U{x) if 
the bundle h{p, iv) uniquely maximizes U{x) over the budget D{p,iu) (1) 
for all {p,w) G V. 
7 For all x,y G Hi', � y " means "a;,- > y,- for all i " ; and "x- > y" means "x,- > yi for all i". W e denote 
by =:{x£lli:x> ()}, and =： { x € ： x » ()}. T h e topology of ITi' is induced by the Euclidean 
norm ||.||. 
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乂 \ 个 ^ ^ n ^ x ) 
Fig 2a. h rationalized by U Fig 2b. h rationalized by U, 3 D view 
An observed (demand) data set is a (finite) set of price-consumption vectors, i.e. a set 
D = { ( p ' , x ' ) } f ^ j , where (p ' , x ' ) £ x (JR'^\{0}), and 1 < T < oo. (Here we assume 
that with (p ' , x ' ) , the consumer's income is w' = p' . x\) We say the data set D is rational 
if there is a. pair {U, h) of utility function U : R'^ M and demand function h : V 
rationalizing D, i.e.: 
a) U generates h, 
b) h is consistent with D, i.e. = h{p\io') for all i — 1 ’ . . •，T, (2) 
where = • x\ 
Then we also say {U,h) is a, rationalization of D. 
13 
八 个 \ 
\ price line of p' \ 1 \ \ 
\ \\\ iXdiff^nce curves 
Fig 3a. Data Fig 3b. Data rationalized by utility 
We will obtain a pair [U, h) satisfying:® 
ID) (Infinite Differentiability) h is C°° (i.e. infinitely differentiable); 
SP) (Special Property) U is continuous, strictly monotone, and strictly concave. 
(Note that even if h is the function U need not be differentiable, e.g. consider the 
utility function of the Leontief preference.) 
个 
> 
Fig 4. Indifference curves of the Leontief preference 
To characterize rationality with (ID) and (SP), we will use the standard Strong Axiom 
8 A s usual, a function U{x) is strictly monotone if: x > y implies U{x) > U{y), and x y h x y 
implies U{x) > U{y). 
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of Revealed Preference (cf. Houthakker 1950, Richter 1966). As us vial, for a data set D = 
{(/J*, we say a bundle x is (directly) revealed preferred to a bundle y, if a: y and 
there is an i such that x^ = x and y 6 where lu^ = p' • x^; then we write xSy. We 
say D satisfies the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP) if the S relation is acyclic 
(i.e. it is impossible to have any finite sequence y\ Sy2 S • • • Sy\). 
个 个 个 k k k 
Fig 5a. xSy Fig 5b. Data satisfying S A R P Fig 5c. Data not satisfying S A R P 
We now give our main result: 
Theorem 1 (Rational-smooth Demand). For any data set D = the fol-
lowing (a), (h), and (c) are equivalent: 
a) D satisfies SARP; 
b) D has a rationalization [U, h); 
c) D has a rationalization (U, h) satisfying (ID) and (SP). 
Remark 1. That (c) implies (b) is clear; and that (b) implies (a) is well-known 
15 
(cf. Richter 1966). So our main contribution is to show that (a) implies (c). i.e. 
D satisfies SARP D has a rationalization [U, h) satisfying (SP) and (ID). (3) 
(For the idea of our proof, see Remark 4 below). 
Remark 2. Matzkin and Richter (1991, Theorem 2) proved that for a data set D: 
D satisfies SARP D has a rationalization {L\h) satisfying (SP). (4) 
This result does not obtain the (ID) conclusion for the demand function; but we obtain also 
(ID). In fact, their method in general fails to give a dijfferentiable demand function. It is 
because their utility construction method'^ yields a kinked utility function (which has kinked 
indifference curves); and a simple example can show that it does not give a differentiable 
demand function.^® 
Remark 3. Chiappori and Rochet (1987) were interested in obtaining both a C°° 
utility and demand function. So they needed to strengthen the SARP into a Strong 
9 See Equation (4 .18) there, where they def inea (kinked) utility function f / (a;) by: U(x) = m i n , = i,...,T{w' + 
A ' p ' [ i - i ' ] - €g{x - i ' ) } , where ff(ii’... ’ a;„) = (a：? + . . • + a：? + T ) " � 一 T小. 
10 For example , consider the data set D = { (p^ , x^) , (p^, where p^ = ( 1 , 2 ) , p^ = ( 2 , 1 ) , and 
j l = 二 i 二 (1 ’ 1). T h e n we choose numbers = u? =： 0 ’ and 入i = A � 二 丄；these numbers solve the 
inequalities (4 .1) in Matzkin and Richter (1991 ) , so for any number T > 0, and any small € > 0’ the utility 
function U(x) defined as in their equation (4 .18) rationalizes the data set D. T h i s function U(x) has the 
f o r m : Uix) = n i in{p ' • x } - ek(x), where k{x) = ( (x i - 1 ” + ( x , - 1尸 - T " � . So U{x) is 
kinked at all x in the diagonal / / = { i G IR^ ： a：) = arj}. Also, t / ( x ) = p ! • i + ek(x) for all x ^ Hi, and 
U{x) — p"^ • X + ek(x) for all x € / / 2 , where Hi = { x G H I � : x i > x o } and " 2 = { x € ffi'^ ： x i < arz}- So 
the indifference curves of U are kinked at all points in the diagonal H, in particular at the point x = (1’ 1). 
T h e n it can be shown that the d e m a n d function h(p, w) of this utility function U(x) is not differentiable, 
e .g . the partial derivative dp^ h{p, li)) at the point {p,w), where w = 3, and p = ( 1 , 2 ) (i.e. p = pM- (For the 
detail , see the A p p e n d i x . ) 
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Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SSARP), which requires the data. D to satisfy the 
SARP and the additional assumption:� 
D is invertible (i.e. (VA G IR++)[p' + V . ] ； + (5) 
八 八 
Fig 6a . Data satisfying S S A R P Fig fib. Data satisfying S A R P but not S S A R P 
They proved that (1987, Theorem, and Corollary): 
D satisfies SSARP D has a rationalization {U,h) satisfying (SP) and (ID). 
(6) 
and such that U is 
Our Theorem 1 shows that if we drop the C°° conclusion on U, then we can drop 
the invertibility assumption on the data. In other words, the SARP alone is sufficient for 
existence of a difFerentiable consistent demand function. 
Remark 4 . To prove Theorem 1, we need to construct a rationalization {U, h) for 
a data set D. A direct approach (cf. Chiappori and Rochet 1987, Richter and Matzkin 
11 Intuitively, the invertibility condition rules out the situation where two budget lines cross each other, 
and the consumer chooses the intersection point, in each one of the two budgets. This is clearly necessarily for 
existence of a C°° utility function. However, our result shows that even a data set violates this invertibility 
condition, it does exhibit a C°° demand function, as long as the data set satisfies the S A R P . 
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1991) is to solve a system of inequalities (cf. Afrait 1967), and then use it to derive a utility 
function for D. However, this approach does not guarantee that the demand function h 
of the constructed utility function is differentiable. In order to have good control over the 
demand h, we will use an indirect approach (cf. Hurwicz and Uzawa 1971), constructing a 
utility function in two steps: 
i) From D we construct a C°° expenditure function e(p，w) such that its derivative h is 
consistent with (See Proposition 1 below.) 
ii) From e(f>, u) we construct a continuous utility function U(ar). (See Proposition 2 below.) 
We make a few definitions. An expenditure function (cf. Diamond and McFadden 1974; 
Blackorby and Diewert 1979, p. 581) is a continuous function e(p, u) from x jR+ into 
JR+ such that: 
a) for each p, e(p,0) = 0’ and e{p,u) > 0 for all u > 0, 
b) for each p, the function e(p, u) is strictly increasing in u, 
(') 
c) for each u, the function e(p, u) is concave, weakly monotone, 
and homogeneous of degree 1 in p. 
12 T h e function h can be viewed as an Hicksian demand function. 
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/ \ 
沪” price line of p expenditure e(p,l) \ \ 
Fig 7a. T h e expenditure function Fig 7b. T h e expenditure^nct ion r e p r e s e n t e d ^ ^ - i c e line 
III our proofs, we will obtain a C°° expenditure function e{p,u) such that:^^ 
e(p, u) is convex in ii for all p. (8) 
We say an expenditure function e(p, u) rationalizes a data set D 二 { ( p \ r c ” } [ i if for 
every i 二 1 , . . . ’ T ’ there is a (utility level) G IB++ such that e(p，.i") is differentiable with 
respect to p at w'), and: 
d p e { p \ u ' ) = x \ (9) 
13 Clearly, if a differentiable e(p, ii) satisfies (8), then: due(p, u) > 0 for all p and all u > 0. 
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八 八 
\ price line of p- W e line of e(p',u-) 
\ x ' \ <9pe(p',u-) 
\ ^^ •^ "•-"•^ rice line of p^  \ line of e(p^u^) 
\ \ > \ \ . ) 
Fig 8a. Data Fig 8b. T h e expenditure function rationalizing the data 
As standard (cf. Blackorby and Diewert 1979, Diewert 1993), for an expenditure func-
tion e(p, w), we define its direct function U : 択 M + by: 
U[x) = max"{w : e(p, u) < p • x for all p G IR�++}. (10) 
八 
e(p 丨,1) \ U ( x ) = l 
e ( p M ) ^ ~ \ Z 
Fig 9. A n indifference curve of U(a；), generated by e as in equation (10) 
For the expenditure functions that we will use, their direct functions U{x) will satisfy 
two properties: 
a) U{x) is continuous; 
20 
b) e(p, u) is the cost function of i.e. 
e(p, u) = min{p • x : a: > 0 & U{x) > u] for all (p,u) G M++ x (11) 
Remark 5 . a) As stated in Proposition la below, the following fact is true: 
if a data set D = satisfies the SARP, then there exists a . . 
expenditure function e{p,u) rationalizing D. 
If we are interested only in obtaining a demand function, not a utility function satisfying 
(SP), then (12) is sufficient for this purpose. In particular，it follows from fact (12) that: 
D satisfies SARP D has rationalization [U, h) satisfying (ID). (13) 
To see (13), we choose a C°° expenditure function e{p,u) rationalizing the data. Then we 
can choose the direct function U{x) defined as in (10). By a standard duality arguments 
(cf. Krisha and Sonnenschein 1990, proof of Theorems 3), it can be verified that U{x) 
satisfies: 
U{x) is upper semicontinuous, quasiconcave, and monotone, (14) 
and such that: 
a) e{p, u) is the cost function of U{x); 
b) w = e{p,v{p,w)) for all (p,w) € V, (15) 
where (indirect utility) v{p, w) = max{i[7(a;) : x G B(p, w)}. 
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By an argument similar to that used in our proof of Theorem 1 below, it can be shown that 
the demand function h{p, w) of the utility function U{x) is and rationalizes the data 
set D. 
b) Therefore, if one weakens (SP) into ( 1 4 ) , t h e n we don't need any new condition 
on the expenditure function. 
Remark 6. We want to construct a utility function which is not only upper semi-
continuous, but also continuous. This is a non-trivial task; in fact there are well-known 
examples in the existing literature, which show that an expenditure function need not have 
a continuous direct utility function (cf. Blackorby and Diewert 1979, pp. 581-583). To obtain 
continuity for the direct function, the existing literature require special conditions on the 
expenditure functions e(p, u) (cf. (Blackorby and Diewert 1979，Theorem 1), (Diewert 1993, 
Theorem 1), and (Blackorby et ah 1978, Theorem A.4)). However, these approachs do not 
cover our context.^^ i® More precisely: 
a) Blackorby and Diewert (1979, Theorem 1) considered a special class of expenditure 
functions which have small domain of prices. In particular, their expenditure functions 
e{p,u) are not defined at all p G but only defined at prices p in a compact set 
14 I.e. one weakens continuity into upper semicontinuity, and weakens strict concavity into quasiconcavity. 
Shephard (1970) studied duality between production function and cost function. Using his methods 
(cf. p.78 there), one can obtain an upper semicontinuous (direct) production function from a cost function, 
which is not-necessarily-continuous. 
16 Also, besides continuity, these works obtained only quasiconcave utility function, but we also want to 
obtain a concave utility functioD. 
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P C For our case, we need an expenditure function to defined at all p G since 
we will use the expenditure function to construct a utility function, whose demand function 
h{p, w) is defined at all p G 
b) Diewert (1993, Theorem 1) assumed that a given expenditure function e : x 
IR+ M+ is the cost function of some continuous function 17, and then proved that the 
direct function U{x) of e agrees with U, i.e. U = U, and then concluded that U{x) is 
also continuous (see proof of (viii) in p. 126 there). For our case, we cannot assume an 
expenditure is the cost function of some continuous function, because this is exactly the 
conclusion that we need to obtain. 
c) Blackorby et al. (1978, Theorem A.4) considered an continuous expenditure function 
e : IR++ X iR-f. — I R + , and assumed that: 
e(p,u) has a continuous extension e* : ( iR+\{0} ) x JR+ — 1R+ such that “ 6 ) 
e*{p,u) is strictly increasing in u for every p 6 iR+\{0} . 
However, this assumption (16) does not generally hold for revealed preference problems. 
In fact, it is easy to find a simple example，a data set D (with “comer bundles") such 
that for every utility function that rationalizes D, its expenditure function must violate the 
assumption (16).^® 
口 In particular, we use a C°° expenditure function e ( p ’ u ) to derive a C°° (Hicksian d e m a n d ) function 
dpe{p, u) which is defined at all p € 沢 ' + + ； this will ensure that the d e m a n d function h(p, w) of the constructed 
Ulx) is defined a n d is differentiable at every p G ZR' , , not just prices p in a compact 
18 For e x a m p l e , consider the following two-commodity , two-observation case. S u p p o s e we observe that 
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Remark 7 . a) Therefore, we need to develop a new condition on expenditure functions, 
which we call "eventual constancy." We will prove that every data set satisfying the SARP 
can be rationalized by some expenditure function satisfying that property (see Proposition 
lb below). Thus “eventual constancy" is a conclusion of our result; it is also a tool for us 
to obtain a continuous utility function. (It is not a special assumption imposed on the data 
set D.) 
b) To motivate our assumption, suppose that there are only two commodities. Fixing 
a utility level u, and also let the price of Commodity 1 be fixed at p\. Let the price p2 of 
Commodity 2 increase. When p2 is extremely high, it is realistic to expect that if a consumer 
wants to minimize the expenditure, then he will stop purchase any Commodity 2, i.e. he 
will purchase some “comer" bundle (x i ,0 ) , and his expenditure will be C = pixi. Now 
suppose that p2 further increases, then the consumer will not change his purchase, so his 
expenditure will still remain constant. This suggests us to consider expenditure functions 
that are "eventually constant." 
a consumer purchases x = ( 1 , 0 ) at price p = ( 1 , 1 ) , and income iv = 1’ and purchases x = ( 2 , 0 ) at price 
p = (1 ’ 1), and income w = 2. A s s u m e the consumer has a utility function U(x), and let u = " ( x ) ’ and 
u = [ f ( x ) . Since x is revealed preferred to x, we must have: u > u. 
Let e{p, ti) be the expenditure function of U(x). T h e n e(p, u) = p • x — 1, and e(p, it) 二 p - ：= 2. Now 
we fix the utility level at u, and consider any p = (Fii,p2)’ where pi 二 1’ and p2 > 1- T o minimize the 
expenditure while maintaining u, the consumer can purchase the bundle i , so the expenditure e ( l ,p2； w ) = 
I x i 4- P2O = 1，hence: e ( l ,p2； u) = 1 for all po > 1. Similarly, it can also be proved that: e ( l , p 2； w) = 2 for 
all P2 > 1-
Now suppose e * ( p , u ) is the continuous extension of e(p, u), and let p* = (0 ’ 1). W e now show that: 
e*{p',u) = 0. First, definep火-=(1/人•，1), then by homogeneity we havee(;3知，ii) = ( l / f c ) e ( l , fc; u) = ( l / f c ) ( l ) . 
Since p^ —y p' as k 00, and since e*( - , •) is continuous, we have: e* (p* , u) 二 lim e(p*Su) = 0. Similarly, 
we also have: e * ( p * , « ) = 0. However, we have: u > u, but at the same time: e* (p* , it) = T h u s 
e(p, u) violates the assumption ( 1 6 ) . 
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Formally, we say an expenditure function e(]?, u) is eventually constant if for all w, the 
function e(p, u) is eventually constant, i.e.: 
for any m — 1, • • •,/, and any fixed numbers Pi! ’ •.. ，there is a large 
number N > Q and a (constant) C E M such that: 
, - _ � r (17) 
, • • • , P.l - 1 , Pil 7 Ptl + l , • • • , Pim-l + ^PhU) = C 
f o r all P i , • • • • • • • • • ,pi > N. 
/ \ 个 
\ indifference curve U(x) = u \ indifference curve U(x) = u 
\ cuts the axi s \ doesn't cut the axi s 
� � V - \ X - -•••--：：：：：；^^ 
〜 : ： 
I - - � � � • T v � - \ \ — 
； \ ‘ " 〉 \ \ - ^ 
Fig 10a. e is eventually constant Fig 10b. e is not eventually constant 
Similarly, we say an expenditure function e(p, u) is uniformly eventually constant (in 
XL) if for all any rn = 1, • • •,/, and any fixed numbers p,�，•  •, pi^，there is a large number 
19 Note that, since e(p ’u) is (continuously) differentiable, it follows clearly from (17) that for all price 
vectors 
P = {Pir--,Pii-i ,Pii ’ +1 ’ _. •, Pi„,-v，Pi„, ’ 7)|川+1，• • • ’ ) (19) 
where Pi, • • •, P u - i , + i, • • • . .P.„, + i ,…，Pi > N， 
the derivative dpe(p,u) satisfies: 
dpe(p, u) = (0，• •.，0, a;，、’ 0 , . •. ’ 0, X i^ , 0，•. • ’ 0) for some x , � , • • • ， . (20) 
Hence (20) also holds at the price p = {N, • • •, , N, • • •, N,pi 饥,N,…，N). 
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N > 0 (uniform in u), such that for all u, there is a constant Cu such that: 20 
for all Pi, •••，P i i - i ’ P i i + i ’ .••， p i „ > — i， p , m + i ,•••，？ / > N . 
Remark 8 . As we will see in the proof of Proposition 2 below, the property of eventual 
constancy allows us to have a good control over the boundary of the constructed indifference 
curves of the direct function. In particular, it prevents these curves from overlapping each 
other at the boundary of consumption space JRi^  ； this is useful for proving that the preference 
(utility) is continuous. 
We now give the two main tools used in our proof of Theorem 1. 
Proposition 1 (Expenditure Rationalization). Let a data set D = satisfy 
the SARP. 
a) Then there exists a expenditure function e(p, u) rationalizing D. 
b) Moreover, one can further require that the function e(p, u) satisfies; 
i) e(p, u) is unifonnly eventually constant; 
ii) e{p, u) is convex in u for all p. 
20 Again since e(p, u) is (continuously) differentiable, it follows clearly from (18) that given these fixed 
p , j , • • •, pi.m ’ for all the price vectors p as given in (19), we have: 
for all It, the derivative , � 
21) 
ape(p,t i ) = ( 0 , - - , 0 , i V for some < 1 ’ … ’ 
and hence (21) also holds at p = ( i V , - - - , p i ^， i V ’ . . .，N ) . 
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Proof: See Section III below. 
Proposition 2 (Continuous Direct Function). Consider a differentiable expenditure 
function e(/vu).2i 
a) If e(p, u) is uniformly eventually constant, then its direct function U{x) satisfies (11) 
and C/(x) is continuous, strictly monotone, and strictly quasiconcave. 
h) If the function e(p, u) is also convex in u for every p, then its direct function U{x) is 
also concave.22 
Proof: See Section IV below. 
. P r o o f o f T h e o r e m 1. By Remark 1，it suffices to prove that (a) implies (c). For a data 
set D satisfying the SARP, by Proposition 1 we can choose a expenditure function 
e(p, xi) that rationalizes D. Moreover, we can further assume that e(p,w) is uniformly 
eventually constant, and such that e{p, u) is convex in u for all p. By Proposition 2, its 
direct function U{x) is continuous, strictly monotone, strictly quasiconcave, and concave, 
and such that U{x) satisfies (11). Since e(p, u) is differentiable, and the vector dj,e{p,u) 
uniquely minimizes p • x over {x G : U{x) > u } for all (p, u), i.e. the C°° function 
dpe{p,u) is the Hicksian demand function of the utility function U{x). By a well-known 
21 If one interprets the expenditure function as a production cost function, then one can interpret the 
constructed U{x) function as a production function. 
22 T h e converse is clear: if U{x) is concave, then e(p, u) is convex in u. 
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duality fact (cf. Varian 1984，p. 126)，it follows that the demand function h{p, w) of U{x) 
satisfies: 
a.) w = e{p,v{p,iv)) for every (p, lu) G V, 
b) h{p, w) = dpe{p, v{p, w)) for every (p, it;) G V, (22) 
where (indirect utility) v{p,iv) = max{U{x) : x £ Bip^w)}. 
By (22a) the function v{p, w) is defined implicitly by the equation: w — e{p, v) = 0; since 
e (p ’u) is and since 5«e (p ’u) > 0, by an Implicit Function Theorem it follows that the 
(indirect utility) function v{p,w) is also C°°. Therefore, the composite function h{p, w) 二 
dpe{p,v{p,w)) is C°°, i.e. (ID) holds. Finally, the function e{p,u) rationalizes the data D; 
so for all i = 1, • • • , T , we have: x ' = � e ( p ， u , ) for some u\ Again, by (22a) we have: 
u' = v{p,w*), where = = p' . x', hence = h(p',w'); in other words, the 
demand function h is also consistent with D. Thus we have obtained a rationalization 
{U,h) satisfying (ID). 
The function U is continuous, strictly monotone, concave and strictly quasiconcave, but 
it need not be strictly concave. We take the continuous monotone transformation y/U{x), 
it is easy to show that if U is strictly quasiconcave and concave, then \/U{x) is strictly 
concave. Since the functions U{-) and y/U{-) have the same preference, they have the same 
demand function h{p, w). Therefore, by replacing U by the function \/U if necessary, we 
can assume that U is also strictly concave, i.e. U satisfies (SP). 
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Thus we have obtained a rationalization {U, h) satisfying both (ID) and (SP). This 
establishes the fact that (a) implies (c); and this also completes our proof of Theorem 1. 
Q.E.D. 
The rest of this paper is devoted to proving Propositions 1 and 2. 
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III. Proof of Proposition 1 
To construct an expenditure for Proposition la, we will combine and modify the utility 
construction method of "linear system of inequalities" due to Matzkin and Richter (1991), 
and the smoothing technique due to Chiappori and Rochet (1987) as follows. 
Proof of Proposition la . Let a data set D = { { p ' s a t i s f y the SARP. In 
Stage 1 below, we will choose (parameters) numbers i/^, • • • A ,^ • • •, A^ solving linear 
system (23). Then in Stage 2 below, using these and A' we define "semi-expenditure" 
functions E{p, i/i)’ • •. ’ E(j), w了) by (24), and then use them to obtain a single "expenditure" 
function E(p,u) by (26). The function E{p,u) satisfies all the desired properties except 
that it is not-necessarily-difFerentiable. In Stage 3 below, we modify it into C°° functions 
e ( p , u ” , . . • by (28)-(34). In Stage 4 below, we extend them into a single smooth 
function e(p, u), which is defined at all u. This e(p, u) is the desired expenditure function 
rationalizing the data D. In Stage 5 below, we provide some technical details. 
(Stage 1: Choosing parameters u�•..，.“了’ 入、...by solving system (23).) Let a data 
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set D = satisfy the SARP. Then: 
there exist real numbers (parameters).“丄，…，u了，入V • • " �了 such that for all i. j : 
a) u，一 u] - 一 ln(p'x'')] > 0 for # 
(23) 
b) A-' > 0 for all j -
c) u* — = 0 for X* = x^. 
Fact (23) follows easily along the lines of the proof of Lemma 1 in Matzkin and Richter 
(1991); (one only need to replace a:' and p' x^ there by ln(p' a;') and ln(p' a;-')). So we 
omit the detail. 
By re-labeling x* if necessary, we could assume that 
d) < ••• < (23) 
Also, since the inequalities (23a,b) are strict, by perturbing these if necessary, we can 
further assume that: 
e) ii' < u^ for i < j and + xK (23) 
By adding a constant if necessary, we can also assume that for all i = 1’. • • ,T : 
f ) > 0. (23) 
(Stage 2: Defining the "semi-expenditure" functions E{p, u') by (24), and a not-necessarily-
differentiable "expenditure" function E{p,u) by (26).) Now we fix the parameters and A' 
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as given in (23a-d). For each i, we define a function : M^ x IR IR by: 
u)=px' exp{/i'[M - u']} where /J = l/\\ (24) 
Fig 11. E � p， l ) 
Then it is clear that for all i,j: 
a) = w\ where w^ = p'x^ 
b) = B'(p\u') = for = x^ 
c) FJ(p\u') > F'(p\ for ^ x^' (25) 
d) B'(p,u) is for X' ^ xJ 
e) B*(p, w) is linear and weakl}' monotone in p for all u. 
As in Matzkin and Richter (1991), by taking the envelope we combine these individual 
functions E^,- •• into a single E function. In particular, we define a function E : JRi x 
m-^ IR by 
E{p,u) = . min E\p,u). (26) 
i=l，…，T* 
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e W ) 小 ，， EVi丨） 八 
Fig 12. E{p, u ' ) , note that JS(p ' , u ' ) arc not on the corners 
Then it follows easily that for alH = 1, • • •, T:^^ 
a) B(p%u' ) = 
b) E(p,u) is concave, weakly monotone, 
and homogeneous of degree 1 in p for all w; (27) 
c) E{p, u) is smooth in some neighborhood of (p'，w') in x R, and ； 
dpE{p, u) = X' exp{/i'[w - u ' ] } Vp E N\ 
(Stage 3: Smoothing the “expenditure，，function E{p, u) into C°° functions e{p, u^),-- •, e{p, u^) 
Note tluit E is nearly the expenditure function that we are looking for, except that it is not 
The next step is to smooth E. First, we fix an i, and the E{p,u^) as a function in p; 
we will transform it into a smooth function e(]?, in In Stage 4 below, we will extend 
these functions e(p, w^), • • •, into a. function e(p, u) on all of x JR+, which is 
23 Also, it is easily shown that for every u, the E{p, u) is generically (cf. Matzkin and Richter 1991). 
It is also easy to show that, if E{p, u) is difTereiitiable at p, then dpE{p, it) = x ' for some i. 
24 T h e reason for this is that E(p, w) at u ：^ it' has nothing to do with the rationalization of the data, 
so we can simplify the process by dealing with each E(p, u') separately. 
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also ill p. 
We fix an i, and consider as a function of p. We will smooth it by using 
convolution (cf. Chiappori and Rochet 1987). First, we choose the standard "pole" function 
f) : IRi — ]R defined by 
exp ~ A / f exp f j r - f T ^ ~ d x if ||.t|| < 1 
咖）二 - V / Jaf VIH|2 — l y (28) 
� 0 otherwise 
Then we choose a very small number ?/, and choose the function : JR.' — M defined by 
Pr,{x) = (29) 
小 个 
个 
儿 j l 会 
Fig 13a.小’） Fig 13b. Pr,{x) Fig 13c. /9(;r) , 3 D view 
For each p G i??/, we define the real number: 
Mpy)= f (30) 
J m' 
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so m') is a function from IR} into El. It is clear that^^ 
a) E{p,u') is inp ; 
b) u^) is concave and weakly monotone in p; (31) 




： : : : : ： II : : 
L^ \ ^ j Q I M 
Fig 14a. E(p, side view Fig 14b. E{p, side view 
/ \ 八 
E(p,u') 1 E(p,u') 
Fig 14c. E{p, 3 D view Fig 14d. E{p, u'), 3 D view 
Now we define the set (smooth manifold): 
E-' ={p:$>Q:E{p,u') = l} (32) 
25 Fact, (31a) follows as in Chiappori and Rochet (1987, p. 690) ; fact (31b) follows since E{p,u') is 
concave and weakly monotone in p; and (31c) follows from the definition (30) . 
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Then it can be verified that for every 
for all p G iRj., , there exists a unique a > 0 such that a p E E - \ (33) 
Now, for all p G 观 define the number e{p, u') by 
1 _ 




• 參 : ， 
Fig 15a. E - ^ Fig 15b. 
We will now show that: 
for each z•，function e{p,u') defined by (34) is 
a) homogeneous of degree 1 and monotone in p; 
b) concave in p; 
c) C ^ ill p; (35) 
d) there is a small rj > 0 such that the satsfies: 
i) e(p,u')=丑'.(TM") for all p E ball(p'.,"), 
ii) dpe{p',u') = 
where the open ball(pS rj) = {p G 此：\\p - < ”}. 
26 In more detail, for every i and p, note that E{ap,u') = 0 and linia-^ co E{ap,u') = oo, 
hence linia-+o E{ap,u') < 0 and liniQ-^ oo E{ap,u') = oo. By continuity there exists an cv > 0 such 
that E{ap, u) = 1. Also, a is unique because if ai < «•>, then: E{ai p, u') < E{a2p,u'), and also: 
Eiai p,u') < E{a2 
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First, it follows clearly from the definition (33) that e(p, u') is homogeneous in p; also 
it is monotone in p since E{p, u^) is monotone in p. Thus (35a) is clear. 
Second, (35b) follows from definition (33) and the fact that E{p, ii') is concave in p. 
(See Stage 5 below.) 
Third, to show (35c), we need to show that that the a-inapping is C°°, which can be 
proved by using an Implicit Function Theorem with the equation: 
E{ap,u')-1 = 0. (36) 
(See Stage 5 below for the detail.) 
To prove (35d), we fix an i. Then we have E'{p\u') < E^{p\u') for all j ^ i. So there 
exists a small r/ > 0 such that < for all p e ball(p�r7) ’ and ail j ^ i. 
Since and E^ are homogeneous of degree 1 in p, so < implies: 
丑 、 办 〈 丑 』 ( 办 4 则 
Therefore, by choosing a smaller 77 > 0 if necessary, we can further assume that (37) holds 
for all p G ball(p:’77)’ and all j + i, so: 
E{ = “ ， f o r aUpG ball(p\ry). (38) 
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Then for all p G ball(;?'，")’ we have: 
二 由 - ⑷ ‘ 抓 
= f (39) 
ybalKO.r,) 
= E \ J y ) (since is linear) 
= 1 ’ 
so e{p/E'{p,u'),u') = 1，hence e(p’w!) = This proves (35d). 
(Stage 4： Joining the functions e(p, if ^  ),•••, into a single smooth expenditure func-
tion e(p, u) defined at 
all of X 1R+,) 
Now, we need to extend the functions ,e{p,u') to a single smooth 
function e(p’u). As we will prove (see Stage 5 below): 
there is a number ^ > 1, close to 1 such that for all j,j' = 1, •.., T, and all 
non-zero p G iR+： 
a) /3e{p,u^) < (l//?)e(p,ii>') for j < j' and x^ ^ x^'• (如） 
b) e(p, u^) = e(p, u^') for j < j' and x^ = x^ . 
We choose such a p. Recall that if x^ = then = for all p; by dropping 
these redundant j' if necessary, we can assume that x^ + x^ for all distinct so we 
have T distinct functions e(p, ),•••, ), satisfying (40). Throughout this proof, we 
will make this assumption. Also, by choosing a smaller ^ > 1 if necessary, we can further 
assume that: 
< ( 1 / ^ K for j < j'. (41) 
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Then we extend the functions e(p,'U^), • •., e(p, u'^) to a single function e : M^^^ x R M 
by taking convex combination, as follows: 
‘ {u/u^)e{p,u^) for u G (-00, 
(ti/ii^)e(p, 11�) for u 6 [ 卢 ’ oo); 
e(p,u)= < 
iu/u*}e(p,u') for u G { { 1 / a n d i 二 1 , - . . ,T ; 
� + (1 — A„ ) ( l /約 for u G ( 1 /外 ,… ] , i = 2 , . . . ’ T - 1 
(42) 
where A„ in (42) is the unqiue A G [0,1] such that u 二 X^u' + (1 — i.e. 
imu…-u 
� 一 （ 1 / 約 u … 厂 � … 
/ \ 八 
， ） ： 
： ； ： ： ： 
_ j _ _ L ^ / M M i I , 
Fig 16a. e(p,u'), side view Fig 16b. e(p, u), side view 
Note that e is piecewise linear in u. Also, for all i, we have: 二 and 
e(p, u) is linear in u in a neighborhood of u\ Also, e{p,ii) satisfies (7a,b,c) and (9). Define 
e{p,u) to be a smoothing of e{p,u) in the same manner as before: 
f e{p, u-OpdOd^ (44) 
J m 
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where C is small. 
Then e is with e(p, = e(j?, u') = e ( p , S o e satisfies (7) and (9); in other 
words it is a expenditure function rationalizing the data D. 
To complete our proof of Proposition la, it remains to give the detail proofs for (35b,c) 
and (40), as follows. 
(Stage 5: Proving (35b,c) and (40).) First to prove (35b), it is clearly sufficient to show 
that the a-mapping defined in (33) is convex. Consider any distinct p，p', and numbers 
a , a ' > 0 such that E{ap, = E{a'p', u') = 1. For any numbers A, A' > 0 with A + A' = 1, 
it suficies to show that: E{{Xa + X'a'){Xp + > 1. Define: r 二 (Aa + A V ) ( A a ' + 
X'a)/{aa'), and 7 = A a 7 ( A a ' + A'a), and 7 ' = X'a/{Xa' + A'a); so 7 + 7' = 1, and 
(Aa + X'a'){Xp + X'p') = r{-yap + 7 ' a V ) . It can be verified that (see Footnote 27) F > 1, 
so E{T{^ap + ^'a'p'),u') > £ ( 7 a p + 7'a'p'，w*). Also, by concavity we have: E{')ap + 
7 'aV，u ' ) > + 二 1. Hence E [ { \ a + A V ) ( A p + > 
To prove (35c), as mentioned above, the a-mapping is defined implicitly by the equation 
(36). So by a well-known Implicit Function Theorem, it suffices to show that da色[ap, •u')|a=:a' > 
0，where E{a*p, = 1. This is true since it follows definition (30) that 
？ 犯 、 a p - l 〜 (45) 
jR'nu da 
27 > 1" is equivalent to that “(入a + A 'a ' ) (AQ' + A 'a ) > a a ' " which is equivalent to that " ln (Aa + 
A ' a ' ) + In(Aa' + A ' a ) > I n a 4- In a ' , " which is obvious by the concavity of the ln(.) function. 
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where U = { � : E { a p —《，《') is smooth } . Recall that (cf. Footnote 4) the function 
is C°° genericaily in p; and if dpE{ap — u ' ) exists, then dpE{ap —�’ tt*) = for some i, 
therefore daE{ap - u')\a = P • > 0. Hence > 0. 
Third, to prove (40)，it is clear that (40b) is trivial since x-^  = x^ guarantees that 
y j = t " ' (see (23c)). It remains to prove (40a). 
To prove (40a), let j < j' and x^ + x^'. By (23e) we have u^ < u^'. Since e{p,u^) and 
e(p，v/ ) is homogeneous of degree 1 in p, it suffices to prove (40a) for any normalized set of 
positive prices. We will choose a small e > 0, and choose the set 
P = {pelR'++:E{p,u^) = €}. (46) 
Recall that the function E{p,u'^) is positive for each p G and is homogeneous of 
degree 1 in p; so it follows easily that for each p G there is a unique A sudi that 
Ap E P, hence this P is a normalized set. Also, as we will show below, 
there is a positive 7 > 1 such that 0 < 7a-'" (p) < a-'(p) for all p e P, . . 
— ~ , f ,/ y ~ ‘ / 
where E{a^{p)p,u^) = (p)p, u^ ) = 1 
Then by setting 卢 二 /7， i t follows that u^) < (l / /5)e(p, u^') (see (47) and (34)). I.e. 
(40a) holds. 
We now prove (47). First, note that the is piecewise linear in p, hence it is 
also uniformly lipschitz in p; so there is an 77' > 0 such that for all p,p' E one has: 
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lb - P'll < rf ^ - £ ( p ’ < ( i / 2 )e , so: 
( l / 2 ) e < < 2e for all p' G ball(p,r/') and all p 6 P . (48) 
Then for these p', and all i = 1, • • •, T we have: 
p . > 5i > 0, (49) 
where 5i = {l/2)eexp{-fJi{u'^ - u')}?^ 
Now we choose any 7 > 1 such that for all 2' = 1，…，T: 
7exp{/ii(w' — u*)} < exp{i2i{u^ — w')}. (50) 
Then we can choose a small 77" > 0 such that for all i == 1，...，T, we have: 0 < [？^‘ + ^ • 
e x p M ^ ' 一 l i ' ) } < [Si + i - exp{^,(u>' - u ' ) } for all ^ € baU(0, r/〃）C JR'. By (49), we 
have p' • x' > Sj, so it follows that for ail i = 1,• • • , T : 
0 < [7P • + ^ • exp{/ii(7z-' 一 u ' ) } < [p • a:' + ^ • z ' ] e x p { " , ( t / - u')} 
(51) 
for all ^ 6 baU(0,77") and aU p G P . 
Now, we will show that for all i = 1’ …，T: 
E'iiap + u 巧 < E‘(ap + C, u^') ( 5 2 ) 
for all a > 1，all p G P, and all i 6 ball(0，"〃). 
Consider any such i, a , p, and Since a > 1, we have ^/a G ball(0, rf). Then by (51) (with 
^ = ( l a ) we have: a[7p-x' + (^/a)• exp{/i(u^ - w ' ) } < + exp{^i(u-'"-ti')}, 
hence: - w ^ } < [ap• + ^• exp{(xr{uj' -«')}； i.e: (52) holds. 
28 T h i s (49) holds since p' • 1 ' - « ' ) } = E'{p',u'^) > E{p',u'^) > ( l / 2 ) e . 
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Now, by re-choosing a smaller q in (29) if necessary, we can assume that 77 < rj'. So by 
(48), we have: 
0 < E{p, u^) < E{p, i/) < 2e for all p E P, (53) 
therefore: 
a-'(p), > 1 for all p e P. (54) 
Again, by re-choosing a still smaller rj if necessary, we can further assume that 7/ < . 
Then by (52), for all p G P , all a > 1, and all ^ G ball(0，?7) C ball(0，"〃)，we have: 
+ < + s o : 五 ( 7 « P + e’ ^^ 勺炎 < ibaiKo,,) E{ap + 
In other words, we have: 
w勺 < E{ap, i / ) for all a > 1 and p G P- (55) 
Therefore, as a^' {p) > 1 (by (54)), we have: 
< 二 1; (56) 
so we have: a^{p) > {p)- This proves (47)，hence also (40). 
This also completes our proof of Proposition la. Q.E.D. 
Remark 9. To prove Proposition lb{i), we require the following Lemma 1, which en-
sures that for any data, we can always add some “corner bundles” x 二（0, ••.,•，i、，0，…，0)， 
where i = 1, • • •, T. This will ensure the constructed expenditure function e(p, u) to be even-
tually constant. 
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Lemma 1 (Adding Data with Corner Bundles). Let a data set D = {{p\ x')}]^^ 
satisfy the SARP. Consider price vectors 了 二 . • • = = (1,1, -. •, 1)，and commod-
ity vectors = 0, • • •, 0), 二（o, 0 ： 『 + 2 ’ … ， ⑴ ， . . . ， 二 （ o ， . . . ， o ” t 「 + 。 . 
Then there are numbers ； c � + V •.,a;�+' such that the extended data set D' = : i = 
1,2，•.., T + / } also satisfies SARP. 
Proof of Lemma 1. First, we consider the smaller extended data set Di = : i = 
1,2, •• • , T , T + 1}. Choosing .-cf^' to be large enough, we can assume that 乞 B{p\iv') 
and a-' G ，^；『+1) for all i = 1 ’ . - . , 2 \ where = . x\ Thus we have: 
is revealed preferred to for all i = 1,...，T, but no re' is revealed preferred to 
Therefore, if the revealed preference relation is acyclic in the original D, then it is also 
acyclic in the extended D i . 
By repeating this procedure, we can add the data one by one, and ensure 
that the final extension D' satisfies the SARP. Q.E.D. 
八 个 
Fig 17a. Original data Fig 17b. Data with corner bundles added 
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Proof of Proposition lb( i ) . Let the data set D 二 二i satisfy the SARP. 
We choose price-purchase vectors ( p 了 ’ … ’ (p^+i ’ x^"*"') as given in Lemma 1. Then 
extended data set D' = { (p ' , . r ' ) : i = 1 ’ . . .，T + / } satisfies the SARP. For this data set D ' , 
we follow exactly the lines of Proof of Proposition la, choose the functions E \ E , E , 
and e(p, u) functions. Since the data set D' satisfies the SARP, the expenditure function 
e(p, u) rationalizes the data set D'，hence also the subset D. 
It remains to show that the function e(p, w) is also eventually constant. By definitions 
(44) and (42), it is easy to verify that if e(p, ) ’ -..，e(p, u了) are eventually constant, then the 
function e{p, u) is also eventually constant. Also, by re-labeling the indices for coordinates, 
it is suffices to consider any i, and any fixed pi，• •. ’异m > 0, and to show that for every 
i 二 1’ …，T " : 
there is a constant C and a large number N such that: (^了） 
e(pi,---.Pn.,pT7i+i, = C if P m + i r - - , P t > N . 
To prove (57)，we begin by considering the sets: 
5i = {i e {I,-- - ,T + 1} : the m + 1'"，...,"" coordinates of are all 0 } 
(58) 
Since the vectors 0；丁+1’...，a；了+爪’怎了+爪+1，.. •，工T+‘ are in the data set, the set 5i 0 and 
S2作 
Now, we can find a large N\ such that for all ii G Si and all 22 E S2： 
E H p i r . ， P m ’ N i , ‘ � N i y � < E H p i， - - 、 P m , N i , - - . , N i V � (59) 
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so 
E ( P i ’ . - . , p „ i , N i , - - - , N i , u i ) = miyE“(^，..-,;5„,,iVi,...,iVi，.u'). (60) 
iiGSi 
Note that by definition of the Si set, for all ii G Si the values jE'i (p i , . ••，Pm’Pm+i，•••，/)/’ = 
{pixY + Pma:J^]exp{/i, J u ' — u'^]}, which is independent of Pm+i,. •, ,Pi- Indeed, for 
this TV, we actually have the fact that: 
E(Jh,.. • ,pm,p„,+u- •. ,p/) 二 C* for all Pm+i,. ••,Pi > -^i, 
where C = .mill •E” (扔,...,p»n，p»n+i，.. • (61) 
” Goi 
= m i l l 版 ？ ？ + •. • — w ” ] } } . 
Thus we have shown that is eventually constant. 
/ \ ,:我 / \ 
. ” E ( p , u ' ) is not eventually E(p，ui) is eventually 
：constant . eonstant 
,〜‘：：：- .1: ： .. 
• r . i^-f-i]*- . •”.‘ 
Fig 18a. Without coiner bundles Fig 181). With corner bundles 
We will now show that is eventually constant. First, we can clearly choose a 
large N > max{(iVi / C ) , N�} such that for all p' 6 ball((g-, iV, •••, TV), 77) and all 




E{p',u') = min = c ( p ; , . . . ’ p ' J ’ 
u 6 5 i 
where c(p[,---,PL) = + …+ 爪 a:: exp i^f ,� (u : - u'l)}}. 
»iGi>i 
( 6 3 ) 
Clearly, for a l l p m + i ， … ’ > N, we also have (63) for all p' E b a l l ( ( | ^ , - - . ,替’ p.爪+i’. . - ,pi),r]). 
So: 
左 ( I , . . . ’¥，P爪+1, ••.，/>,，《') = • • • ' ^ ^ P m + i r U ^ ) P r , { m 
= 人 , 五 ( ( • ’ . . . ’ … " V H ’ y ^ P r A m 
S 五(¥，.••，苦，iV,…，iV，u‘） (by concavity of E) 
= 1 . 
( 6 4 ) 
Also, note that for all a > 1，we have 
所a祭’ . . .，a奢，aiV’ . . .，aiV乂）= 营 ， … ， , … 沖 , ( 6 5 ) 
Now since 
oo as a oo, (66) 
G G 
so again by continuity and strict monotonicity, there exists a unique a > 1 such that 
M a 备 . . ’ a 苦 , c ^ i V , . . . ， a A U : ) = 营’… ’ a 苦’ a p 爪+i，... ’ a p i , = 1, ( 6 7 ) 
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so 
e(fi’，-.，^m，CiV,-..’CiV，,u'):=e(fi’--.，Pm，C>n^+i’-..’C>,,u') = (68) 
a 
Thus we have show that: 
_ _ C 
e(内，…，歹m，Pm+i’.••，P(’u') = — for all Pm+i,-" • ,Pi>CN, (69) 
Q 
SO (57) follows, and hence e(p, u*) is eventually constant in p. Hence e{p, w)，as a linear combi-
nation of these finitely many e(p, functions, is also eventually constant (indeed, uniformly 
eventually constant in u); and hence e(p, u) is also eventually constant (indeed, uniformly 
eventually constant in u). This completes our proof of Proposition lb( i ) . Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition Ib(ii). We will modify Stage 4 in the construction of the 
e (p ’u) function in our proof of Proposition la, yielding a function e{p,v) such that e(p, v) 
is convex in v for all p. 
First, we choose the functions e(p,u^), • • •, e(p,u了）constructed in Stage 3 of the proof 
of Proposition la above. Then we choose a /? with 1 < /3 < 2 as given in (40). Recall 
that if x^ = x^', then e{p, u^) = e{p, u^') for all p; by dropping these redundant j' if 
necessary, we can assume that x^ ^ x^ for all distinct j , so we have T distinct functions 
e(p，ui) ,M'，e(p，uT) . 
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Now, we define functions e' : JR'++ JR+, where i = 0, • • •, 2T — 1, by:'^^ 
e�(p) = 0; 
e'(p) = if i is even; (70) 
e'(/>) = ~ e ( p , u ^ ) if i is odd. 
Then we define u V . •’ 了 ] recursively, by: 
v^ = 0, v^  = 1 
e , f «� （叩 
y' = [ i i i f . - ” ' 一 + f o r a l l i = 2’3，---，2:r-l . 
It is easy to verify that^® for all i = 2, • • •, 2T - 1: 
inf S ^ > 1. (72) 
Hence it follows easily that: 
0二 i ; 0 < t ; i < t ; 2 < . . . < z ; 2 T - i . (73) 
Now we show that for all i = 2, • • •, 2T — 1, and all p � 0 ， w e have: 
< e ' ( p ) - e ' - M p ) ( 
” i - l — yi~2 一 yi — yi-1 . � ) 
To see (74), note that by (71) we have: 
. / . , = [inf < ( _ 4 ^ ) ( _ J ^ ) ’ (75) 
” 1 - 1 一 ” 卜 2 Lp�o e ' - i ( p ) V - 1；:-2 - � e ' _ i ( p ) ” ‘ - \ ‘ 
29 So: ei(p) = (08 + l ) / 2 ) e ( p ’ t i i ) ’ ^nd e ^ p ) = (2 /03 + l ) )e(p ,u2) , and e^p)=((卢 + l ) / 2 )e (p , u^), and 
. . a n d = 爾 + l))e(p, «丁），and e 2 T - i ( p ) : ( ( � + l)/2)e(p,以丁）. 
In more detail, consider any i = 2, • • •, 2 T — 1. Suppose i is odd, then for all p � 0 ’ we have: 
e'(p)/e'-Up) = + 1 )2 /4 > 1’ so i n f p � o { e ' ( p ) / e 一 i (p)} 二 + 1)-/4 > 1. Suppose i is even, then by 
(40) for all p � 0 ’ we have: /3e(p，W?) < ( l / ^ ) e ( p , u ' / 2 + i ) , so [(4/32/(/3 +1)2 ) ( /3 + l)/2]e(p，《，_") < [2/(/3 + 
l ) ] e ( p , w ' / 2 + i ) , hence: (4 沪/G9 + l”）e ‘ - i (p ) < e'.(p)’ and consequentially, e'{p)/e'-'(p) > 4 /3V(;3 + 1)2. 
Therefore, we also have: i n f p � o { e ' . ( p ) / e ' - i (p)} = 4沪 / ( / 3 + 1 ” > 1. This proves (72). 
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so: 
~：； ：”X ^ —： ： ~ ( / 0 ) 
.y 卜 1 — yl-2 - — y 卜 2 . ^ ’ 
hence (as - " ‘ 一 ” > (t'' 一 i；'"') > 0 (by (72)) we have: 
e ' - ' i p ) - e ' - H p ) e ' i p ) - e - ' ( p ) 
”.-】一— - 2 ^ ”i- t ’ ' - 2， 、 … 
then (74) follows (as v ' - ' ' < ” ‘ - ” . 
Now, we define a function e{p,v) from IR++ x R into M by:^^ 
如 ) = 二 〜-”。)+ 咖 for …1; 
e'+Un) - eUv) .,1 
e(p, v) = " " “ — — - O + e'(p) for v' < v < where i = 1，. • •，2T - 2; 
\ Ul十 1 一 
eiP.v) = 之:::：?)(.” 一 + e ^ ^ - ( p ) for < u. 
(78) 
For every p, the function e{p,v) is piecewise linear, with kinked points (p, v^), (p, v^), - • •, (p, 
Also, at these points we have: 
S(p,v') = e'(p), e(p,v') = e'(p), = e'^-'(p); (79) 
and for all p � 0 : 
d.e(p, v) = ”o for all v G {oo,v') 
dr,e{p,v) = " + : , ( : � ) - e : ( P ) f o r a l l ” e ( ” � ” ' . + i )，w h e r e i = 1, • • •, 2T - 2 (80) 
V 一 V 
氏e(p’ v) = _ y2T-2~ for all y G {v ，oo). 
31 So: e(p, v) = ve^ (p) for v < v^. 
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By (74) and (80), the derivative dve{p, v) is weakly increasing almost everywhere, so it 
follows that: 
e(p,v) is convex in v for all p. (81) 
Also, by (70), (78) and (79), it follows that there are numbers v^, - • • such that 
t;0 <{；^  < 
(82) 
I；了-2 <{5了 < 
such that e{p, v^) = 0 
e ( p , = e(p, for all i 二 1,. • • ,T . 
/ \ simply extending e(p,uO to e(p’u) 个 / e(p,v) is convex 
cannot yield convex e(p,u) / 
e(P’u:).•.....••• \ 
e(P，u'). , . . • ： e(p,u') /；： 
^ ； i � u i -J \ V 
Fig 19a. e(p,w') Fig 19b. e(p, ？;) 
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八 八 
k \ u = l . l l 
Fig 1.9c. T h e effect is the same as redefining the values of the indifference curves so that utility is concave 
Therefore, we can choose a small 77 > 0 such that e{p,v) is linear in all the open 
intervals - v' + 7). Then we define: e(p, y) = f択 e(p, v — For all p � 0 , the 
e{p,v) is convex in v. Then as shown in Stage 4 of the proof of Proposition 1, this is a C°° 
expenditure function rationalizing the data set D. Since e(p, v) is linear combination of the 
eventually constant functions e(p, u^), • • •, e(p, m了), it follows from the proof of Proposition 
lb(i ) that the function e(p,v) is uniformly eventually constant, hence the function e(p,v) is 
also unifoniily eventually constant. Q.E.D. 
52 
IV . Proof of Proposition 2 
We consider a uniformly eventually constant and differentiable expenditure function 
e(p, u). To study its direct function U{x), we begin by choosing, for each u 6 [0，oo), the 
(upper contour) set Uu, where^^ 
Un = f ] { x e M ^ + : p - x > e(p, u ) } . (83) 
P》(） 
M 
Fig 20. Uu 
We will make use of the following properties of these U" sets; and these facts will be 
proved later. 
32 These Uu sets corresponds to the preference y defined by 
x y y ^ (Vu)[y € Uu x 6 Uu]-
A n d our proof shows that this is indeed the preference of the direct function U{x). 
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Claim 1. For all u, 33 
a.) the set Uu is closed, convex, and monotone; 
b) For each u > 0 and each p � 0 , the vector x = dpe{p,u) uniquely (84) 
minimizes p • x over Uu • 
Claim 2. For all ，35 
a) if X G bdy(?7„), then there exists a vector p � 0 and a scalar a > 0 
such that the set H = {a; G M' : p - x = a} is a supporting hyperplane 
of Uu passing through x, i.e. p • x < p • y for all y G Uu； (g5) 
b) if u < u, then: x G bdy(^7„) x e i n t ) ; 
c) if X G then x G bdy({7u) for some u. 
Claim 3. For every x G there is a unique Ux such that: 
a) X e hdy{UuJ； (86) 
b) X ^ Uu for all u > Ux-
八 
Fig 21. Boundaries of U，i:s are well separated 
Proof of Proposition 2. Let an expenditure function e ( p , u ) be differentiable and 
uniformly eventually constant. We choose the Uu sets as defined by (83). Then it follows 
33 A s standard, a set ( /„ is said t,o be monotone if x < y and x E Uu y ^ Uu-
Properties (a’b) are proved by using the assumption that e{p, u) is eventually constant; and property 
(c) is proved by using the assumption that e{p, u) is uniformly eventually constant. 
35 T h e notat ion" int( ( /u) " denotes the interior of Uu in the subspace ’ so "x G 'mt{Uu)" means "x G Uu 
and such that there is an 7/ > 0 such that ball(a:,77) n IR'+ C Uu" And bdy(t/u) = "u\int("u). 
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from Claim 3, the direct function U{x) of e{p,u) (as defined by (10)) satisfies: 
U{x) = Ux, where Ux is defined by (86). (87) 
First, we will prove that U{x) is strictly monotone, strictly quasiconcave, and continu-
ous. 
{Strict Monotonicity). Consider any x,y S B.+ with y > x and x — y. We need to 
prove that Uy > u^, where y e bdy(t / ' «J, and x e bdy(?7«J. Suppose not, i.e. u^： > Uy. 
We choose a p » 0 supporting Uuy at y, then e{p,xiy) = p- y > p- x (as y > a: and y + x) . 
However, we also have: x eUu^ Q U^^ (as Ux > Uy), so p-x > e(j?, Uj,), a contradiction is 
derived. Thus we must have: Uy > Ux, and so U{-) is strictly monotone. 
[Strict Quasiconcavity.)^^ Consider a pair of distinct and numbers u^^uy with 
X e bdy(ux) , and y € b d y ( t / u j . We consider any A G (0，1), and define: 2 = Aa; + (1 - X)y. 
We also choose the number u^ such that 2： 6 bdy( i7„J . Without loss of generality, we 
assume that Uy < Ux. We need to show that Uy < u：. We prove by contradiction. Suppose 
not, then u： < Uy < ti!.’ hence z,y,x E Uu:. Since u : G bdy(l7u, )，by (85a) there is a p � 0 
such that 2 minimizes p . x' for all x' G so by (84b) we have z = Un,), hence: 
e{p,UuJ = p • z. Now, note that since 2 = Ax + (1 - A)y, so p • z = Ap • x + (1 —入)p . y, 
hence: either p-x<p-zovp-y<p-z. But since z = dpe(p, Uu,) uniquely minimizes p • x' 
36 First , note that each Uu is convex (see (84a) ) , so it is trivial that the preference y is convex. T h e 
non-trivial part is to show that it is indeed strictly convex. 
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over Uu, and since x,y E Uu:, it follows that either :r = 2 or y 二 2; but either one of them 
implies that x = z = y, contradicting the assumption that x and y are distinct. This proves 
that we must have: •“： > Uy, hence U{-) is strictly quasiconcave. 
(Continuity) The image(£/")=_K+ which is connected; so to prove that O'(-) is continuous, 
it is sufficient to prove that the preference t： of U is continuous. In other words, we need 
to prove that for every x G IR'+’ that both the strictly preferred set 二 {2/ G iR+ : t/ >- x } 
and the strictly worsen set W = {y G IR�+ : y ^ x} are both open. If x = 0, then as ^ is 
strictly monotone, it is clear that V is open, and W is empty. Next consider any non-zero 
X. Then the sets V and W are clearly open once we have shown that: 1) V = int(J7u^), 
and ii) W = To see (i) and (ii), consider any y e Suppose y 缘 Ih:, then 
Uy < Ux where y G bdy(C/uJ’ so y ^ x. Suppose y G bdy(Z7u^), then by (87) we have: 
y � X . Suppose y G int(i7„^). Choose Uy such that Uy with y G bdy(^7ujJ. Then we must 
have Uy > Uj；. Otherwise: Uy = Ux implies: y E bdy(l7M^), contradicting the hypothesis that 
y G mt{Uu^)] and Uy < «x implies: y 6 mt{Uu^) C int(i7u„), contradicting the hypothesis 
that y e hdy{Uy). Thus y G mt{Uu^) implies y y x. Therefore, (i) and (ii) follows, and 
hence ^ is continuous, so U{-) is also continuous. 
(Duality) Next we will prove (11). We consider any {p, u ) � 0 . We choose the vector 
X = dpe{p,u), so X e bdy(C/'u), hence U{x) = u. Then: m m f p • x : U{x) > w} < p • x = 
e{p, u). It remains to show that it is impossible to have niin{p • x : U{x) > u } < e(p，w). 
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Suppose not; then there is an x G bdy(t/"„^) with u^ > u, and p - x < e{p, u). But then 
Ux > u implies x G Uu, but at the same time p • x < e{p,u) = p • x, contradicting the 
fact that X uniquely minimizes p • y over the set Uu (see (84b)). This contradiction ensures 
iiiin{/) • X : U{x) >x} = e{p,u}, i.e. (11) holds. 
(Concavity) Now, assume further that e(p, ii) is convex in u for all p. We will show that 
the direct function (7(‘t) is concave. Consider any x,y E M'^, and any A G (0,1). Define 
2 = Ax + (1 — A)y. Since U{x) = Ux, and U(y) = Uy, we have: x G Uu:, and y G Uu^ 
We will show that *): z G ^7入《龙+(i-a)«j^ ’ hence w: > Au^ + (1 - A)wj,, so: U{z) = u^ > 
XU{x) + (1 — X)U{y). To prove (*), note that for all p > 0, as x G Uu^ and y G Uu^ ’ we have: 
p-x > e(p,iix), andp-y > e{p,Uy), so: p-z > Ae(p,«x) + (1-A)e(]?, Wj,) > e(p, + 
(since for every p, e{p, u) is convex in u). In order words, we have p-z > e(p, Xu^ + (1 - X)uy) 
for all p, hence (*) follows. Thus the utility function U is concave. 
Thus we have proved Proposition 2. Q.E.D. 
It remains to prove Claims 1，2 and 3. 
Proof of Claim 1. Fact (84a) is clear since each set {x e 贝!)_ : p • x > e (p ,u) } is 
closed, monotone, and convex (as e(p，u) is concave in p for each u), and since Uu is the 
intersection of these sets. 
To see (84b), consider the vector x = 5pe(卢，u). First, we show that x e Uu- Since 
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e(p, u) is concave in p, for all p we have: e{p, u) < e(p, u) + {p-p) • dpe{p, ii) = e(p, u) - p-
dpe�p, u)+p-x. Since e(p, u) is homogeneous of degree 1 in p, we have e(p, it) = p-dpe{p, u); 
so we have: e(p, u) < e{p, u) — e(p, u) + p • x = p • x. Hence x ^Uu-
Moreover x minimizes p • x over Uu, since x E Uu and since p-x > e(p, u) = p-x for aJl 
X G Uu (see the definition of Uu)-
Indeed, x uniquely minimizes p • x over Uu. Let x e Uu also imnimizes p - x over Uu-
Then we have: i) p • x > e(p, u) for all p G M^^^ (as x G Uu), and ii) p • 5 = p • 5 = e(p,u). 
In other words, p minimizes the value p • x — e(p，u) over p G and so by a standard 
First Order Condition of Minimization, we have: x — dpe(p，u) = 0, so x = dpe{p,u) = x. 
Hence (84b) holds. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Claim 2. [Proving (85a).) We consider any u and any x 6 bdy(l7u). We 
want to find an a and p � 0 as claimed in (85). Such a，p clearly exists if x = 0. So we 
assume x ^ 0. There are two cases: 1) 5 � 0 , and 2) x ^ 0. 
(Case 1) Suppose x � 0 . Since Uu is convex and closed, by a standard supporting 
hyperplane theorem there exists a non-zero vector p £ M^ and a scalar a E M such that 
the set H = {x E : p • X = a} IS & supporting hyperplane of Uu passing through x, i.e. 
p • X = a < p • y iov all y £ Ut,. Since Uu is a monotone set, it follows that p > 0; so as 
X � 0 ， w e have p • x = a > 0. 
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It remains to show that p � 0 . Suppose not, then p == (pi, • • • ,pi) has some coordinate, 
say Pi = 0. Since e(p, u) is eventually constant, we can find a large N and a constant C 
e( l ,p2, • • • = C for all p'o, ••• > N (see (17)), so (see (20)) we have: dpe{p,ii) 二 
(x i , 0, • • •, 0) for some x i , where p = (1’ iV,.. .，N). So by (84b), we have: (x.i,0, • • •, 0) E 
but then p • (x i , 0,…，0) = 0 < a which is a contradiction. Thus all p, 's must be positive. 
This proves (Case 1). 
(Case 2) Suppose x ^ 0. Without loss of generality, suppose 
X = •••,0), where afi，-. • ， > 0. (88) 
Define = 17« H IR^ x { (0 , • • • , 0 ) } , where (0，.. • ’ 0) is the I - m dimensional zero vec-
tor. Then U' is convex and monotone, and x = (i , i ’ • .•’5爪，0’ •..，0) 6 bdy({7 ' ) . Also, 
since e(j9, u) is eventually constant，by the same method as used in the proof of (Case 
1) above it follows that there are numbers xi ,• • • ,x^ > 0 such that the /-dimensional 
vectors (x i , 0, • • •, 0), • • •, (0, • ' ' , 0, 0 • • •, 0) G U^- Viewing U' as a subset of m*, it 
follows (as in Case 1) that there are numbers pi , • • •, pm > 0 such that for the vector 
p = (pi , • • •, pm, 0, • • •, 0), we have: p • x > p • x for all a: G U'. 
We will now modify p into a p � 0 such that p • x > p • x for not only all x G 
but also all x G Uw Since e{p', u) is eventually constant, we can choose a large N such 
that there is a constant C for which e(pi，... ’ Pm ’ Pm+i ’…，p',, = C for all p � + i , > 
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N, hence �e (p i，• .，p„»，A'’. ••，iV’ u)=(工‘!，. • -，o^’ 0，•，.，0) for some ar'i, • • •, a^• De-
fine: p = (pi, ••“ jPm, -^ V, • • •, N), SO p � 0 . Also since dpe{p, u) 二 a;' (where x'= 
(.t'i, • • •, x'^,0, • • •, 0)) by (84b) the vector x' uniquely minimizes p • x over Uu• Note that 
p • X = p • X < p • x' (as x' G I7'), and also that p • x' = p • x'; so p • x < p • x'. Since x' is 
unique minimizer of p • x, it follows that x = a:', and x also uniquely minimizes p • x over 
Uu. Since p � 0 ， t h i s establishes (Case 2). This completes our proof of (85a). 
(Proof of (85b).�Let u < u^ and x £ bdy(?7u). Suppose x • 'mt{Uu)- Then x G 
hdy{Ui). By (85a) there exists a supporting hyperplane H = {x £ JR' : p • x = a} of Ua 
passing through x with p � 0 and o： > 0. Note that it is also a supporting hyperplane 
of Uu- So X also minimizes p • x over Us, and also over Uu. Therefore, by (84b) we 
have: de(p,-u) = x and de{p, u) = x; since e homogeneous of degree 1 in p, it follows that 
e{p, u) = p • dpe(p, u) = X = p • dpe(p, u) = e(p, u). This contradicts the fact the e(p,.) is 
strict monotone (i.e. e(p,u) < e(p,u)). Thus we must have x G int{Uu). This proves (85b). 
{Proof of (85c). ) Clearly, if a; = 0, then x € bdy(t/o). 
Now consider any non-zero x > 0. We define u = sup{u : x G l/u}- Clearly, u is 
well-defined.^" We will first show that x G l/y, and then show that indeed x E bdy(C/V). 
First, we show that x G 17,-,. Suppose not, x ^ Ua. Since Uu is closed and monotone, 
37 Since e{p, 0) = 0, so i € t/o • To see that that w < oo, we choose any p » 0, and note that e(p, u) oo 
as u — o o , so e(p, u) > p • x, and hence x ^ Uu for all large u. 
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there is an 77 > 0 such that the vector x' = x + (77, • • •, 77) ^ U‘a. Since x�0，we have x ' � 
0. Again, a supporting hyperlane theorem guarantees that there is a non-zero supporting 
vector p and point x G bdy(j7fi) such that: x is the point in Ua closest to x', and that: 
p • x' < p • X < p • y ior ail y E Ua. Since a : ' � 0 and the set Uz is monotone, the closest 
point X must be strictly positive, and hence the supporting vector p > 0. Then by (84b), 
we must have: x = de{p,u), and by homogeneity of e we have: e(p,tl) = p - x. Also, for all 
5 > 0, we have x G Uu-s, so p-x > e{p,u — 5), therefore: e{p^u) — e{p,u — 5) > p-x -p-x = 
{p-x -p-x') + {p-x' - p - x ) > 0 + {J2iPi)r] > 0. Thus ]lms-,o e{p,ii - S) < 
contradicting the continuity of e. Hence we must have x € Ua. 
Now, we show that x E bdy(C/s)- We will prove by contradiction. Suppose x 乞 hdY{Uu). 
Since x G Uq, we must have x £ int(l7u). There are two cases: 
(Case 1) Suppose x > 0. Then we can choose a small 77 > 0 be such that ball(x,77) C 
Uu 门 Define the point x' = x - ("/2，. - •， 7 7 / 2 )� 0 . And we choose the set U'= 
U{？7„ : X ^ Uu}, then ball(a;', J ) 6 Uu\U'. For the monotone, closed, and convex set 
c\{U'), we can choose the point x G cl((7') closest to x' and a supporting vector x such that: 
p . x ' < p • X < p • y for all r/ £ d{U'). Again, since cl{U') is monotone, we have 5 � 0 and 
so p » 0.38. For all 5 > 0, we have: Ua+s Q hence p • y > p • x for all y e Un^s, so: 
38 This can be proved along the lines used in the proof of (Case 1) of (85a), by noting that the eventual 
constant property of e ensures that there are vectors ( i i , 0, • • •, 0), • • •, (0, • • •, 0, Xm) in c l ( { / ' ) . 
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e(p, u + 5) > p-x > p-x'. Also, note that e(p, Ti) < p-x' (as x' € Uu)- Therefore, for all 5 > 0, 
we have: e{p,u + S)-e{p,u) > p'X-e{p,u) > p-x-p-x' > 0. So l i 叫 + > e(p,u), 
contradicting the continuity of e. So we must have x £ hdy{Uu) when a : � 0 . 
(Case 2) Suppose x ^ 0. Without loss of generality, let x = (x i , • • •, Xm, 0, • • •, 0), 
where x i , • • • ,Xm > 0. Since x G int(C/s)，we can choose a small 77 > 0 such that x' e Ua, 
where x' = (xi — r),--- ,Xm — 0, • • • ,0) and x,- — 77 > 0 for all i = 1’ … ， m . We choose the 
set U' = U{Uu ： X ^ Uu}, and consider the set cl{U*), where U* = tT(门 I T " x { ( 0 , , . . ’ 0 ) } ) . 
Then we can choose the point x E 01(17*) that is closest to and p = (pi, •'' iPm,0, • • • ,0) 
(where 罗1’ •. •，卢m > 0) such that: p-x^ <p-x<p-y for eJlyG c l ( � * ) . Since e(p, u) is 
uniformly eventually constant in u, we can choose a large N such that for all J > 0, there is a 
constant C5 such that for all p “ + i ’ > TV, one has: e(pi，•. •’ Pm, p'^+i， . . . , 权 + = 
Cs•，so at the price p = (pi, •' • -/V, • • •, AT), for every 5 � 0 ， t h e partial derivative: 
dpe{p,ii + 5) = xs, where xs is in the form of x j = (£<j,i，- ••’ x<s’m，0，• •.，0). Since xs G Uu+s, 
we have xs eU*, hence p-xs > p-x. Also, since 5pe(p, = xs, we have: e(p, u + 5 ) = p-xs. 
Therefore, for all 5 > 0，we have: e(p, ii + 5)=p-xs = p-xs>p-x>p-x'=p-x'> e(p, u) 
(as x' E Uu). So lim<5—0 e(p,u + ( J ) � e ( p , w), contradicting the continuity of e. So we must 
have X E bdy(i7i ) even when x 0. This proves (85c). 
We are done for the proof of Claim 2 Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Claim 3. Consider any x G M'^. 
Clearly, when x = 0, then x E Uq, and x 贫 Uu for all u > 0 (since e(p, u) > 0 for u > 0). 
So suppose X ^ 0. By (85c), there is an w such that x E bdy([/"„). Suppose x G bdyt'V 
for some + u. Without loss of generality, let u' < u. Since x G bdy(J7u'), by (85a) 
there is a p � 0 such that x uniquely minimizes p • y over Uu' ’ and hence by (84b) we 
have: dpe(p, u') = x, so e(p, u') = p - x. But then e(p, u') = p . z 么 e{p, u) (since x G Uu), 
contradicting the fact that e is strictly increasing in utility and that w > it'. This proves 
(86a). In fact, the preceding argument also shows that it is impossible to have "x G hdy{Ul^) 
and X eUn where u' < u." Thus (86b) also holds. Q.E.D. 
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Appendix 
Consider the utility function U{x) as given in Footnote 10, i.e. 
U{x) = min{pi . a-，p^ • a-} + ek(x), (A . l ) 
k(x) = {{xi - 1)2 + {X2 - 1)2 + T ) " 2 一 了1/2. Let h{p, w) be the demand function of U{x). 
We will show that for all small e > 0, the partial derivative dp^h{p,iv) does not exist at the 
point (p, w), where p = (1,2), and tD = 3. 
We begin by studying the indifference curves of U. First, recall that 
I7(:r) = pi . ar + e f c � for all x E Hi, 
U{x) •x + ek{x) = p2 . a； + ek{x) for a]l x £ H, (A.2) 
U{x) = p^ • a: + €k{x) for all a; G H2, 
where (as in Footnote 10) p^ = (1,2), and p^ = (2,1), (lower portion)丑1 = {a: E iR^ •：工1 > 
X2}, (diagonal) B = {x G JR^ : xi = X2}, and (upper portion)丑2 = {a； G ： < X2}. 
Then at every non-diagonal a;, the marginal rate of substitution of the indifference curve 
containing x is: 
a) MRS(.) = = for a l l . G i ^ . 
‘ (7(x) 2 - ek2{x) 
(A.3) 
b) = . ^ Z L i M f l f o r a l l x E F . -
dx^U[x) 1 - ek'iix) 
Now consider prices p = {p\, 2) where pi are close to pi = 1. By using the MRS as 
given in (A.3a), we now show that for all small e, we have: 
a) Pi > 1 => h{p, w) e H, 
(A.4) 
b) Pi < 1 h{p,w) e Hi. 
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First, for every pi, the budget line with, {p, id) intersects the diagonal H at the vector 
x^ = (3/(pi + 2)，3/(pi + 2)). For each x^, its indifference curve P is convex to the orgin, 
and is kined at x^] by (A.3a) the right derivative of the curve P at x^ is: 
lim MRSix) = where s ( x ^ ) = 丄 一 ' 卞 卞 ( A . 5 ) 
xeL,x^xP 、 乂 \ " \ ' 2 - ek-iixP) \ 乂 
Therefore, to prove (A.4) it clearly suffices to prove that: 
s{xP) > p i / 2 for Pi < 1, 
s(zP) = pi/2 for Pi = 1, (A.6) 
s(xP) < Pi 12 for Pi > 1. 
To see (A.6), note that at pi = 1, we have x^ = x — (1，1), so ki{xP) = k^ixP) = 0, hence 
= 1 /2 二 P i /2 . As we will show, for all small e > 0, we will have: 
譬 <1 /2， （A.7) 
hence (A.6) follows immediately. To see (A.7), note that by doing differentiation, we have 
for all Pi: 
^ ^ = eJ{p) + eL{p l (A.8) 
where J{p) and L{p) are terras that have uniformly bounded v a l u e s s o (A.7) holds for all 
sufficiently small e > 0. 
39 W h e r e 
_ , - ( 2 - 6fe2(xP))/ :ii(xP) + ( 1 - ( x ) ) A : o i ( x P ) � d x \ 彻 = ( ) 
“、—广 ( 2 - ek2(xP))ki2(xP) + (1 - €kr(x))k22(xn�dx^ 
帅)二 ( 
i 
and (dx^/dpi) = (dx^/dpi) = 一 3 / ( p i + 2 ) 2 . Since the derivatives ki(x),k2ix),kn(x), ki2(x),k2i(x) are 
uniformly bounded in r , so the terms J(p) , and L(p) are uniformly bounded. 
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Then by (A.4) it follows that for the xi = {h{p, id))i, and all pi close to 1，we have: 
a) if pi > 1, then xi = 3/(pi + 2); 
b) if Pi < 1, then xi is implicitly by the equation: (A.9) 
Ev � Pi 1 - . , 3 - p i x i 巧外，A) = = 0 where 巧 二 
By (A.9a) it follows that at pi = 1, the right derivative is 
0 + = “ U — " 3 . (A.10) 
By (A.9b) it follows that at every p<l , the derivative dxi /dpi = —dp^F/dxiF] so at pi = 1， 
the left derivative is: 
fdxi dF/dpi 
(—•”~) = iim — , _ , - ~ 
dpi pi<i,(pi,x)-^(i,x) dF dxi 
( A . l l ) 
1 /2 -6A ' (p i ,X2 ) 
= iim — — ， 
Pi<i，(Pi’r)~Ki’i) - e G ( p i , x i ) 
where K{p\,Xi) and G(p i ,x i ) are terms that have uniformly bounded values，。Therefore, 
for all small e, we have: {dxi/dpi)~ # 一1/3 二 In other words, dpih{p,w) does 
not exist at the point {p,w). 
•10 Where 
, ( 2 - efc2(x))fei2(x) - (1 — ek, {x))k22 � � d x 2 
八(Pii^i) = ( ) ‘ 
广， 、 , ( 2 - efc2(x))fcio(x) - (1 - ^ki(x))k22{x), 9X2 , (2-€k2{x))kn-{l-€ki{x))k,2{x) 
G(P1’") = ( ) “ + {2-eh(x)r- ’ 
and dxo/dpi = - x i / 2 , and dx^ldx^ = - p i / 2 . Since the derivatives ki{x), k2(x), kii{x), ky2(x), k^i (x) are 
uniformly bounded in i , so the terms H{pi, n ) , and G{pi , z i ) are uniformly bounded. 
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Chapter 3 
Revealed Smooth and Homothetic Preferences 
I. Introduction 
This chapter introduces a new axiom called the Strong Strong Axiom of Revealed Ho-
mothetic Preference (SSHA). It combines the Strong Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference 
(SSAR) (cf. Chiappori and Rochet (1987)) and the Strong Axiom of Revealed Homothetic 
Preference (SHA) (cf. Liu and Wong (2000)). We will prove that a finite set of price-
consumption data satisfies SSHA if and only if it is rationalizable by a homothetic and 
smooth preference. The result integrates the previous results in obtaining differentiable 
preference generator (cf. Chiappori and Rochet (1987)) and in obtaining homothetic pref-
erence generator (cf. Varian (1983), and Liu and Wong (2000)). 




The commodity space is the price space is JRf^^, the price-income space is V = 
R'^^ X ! ?++ . 1 A budget set is a set B{p,w) = {x E IR'^ ： p • x < ix;}, where (p, ly) 6 V. 
A utility function is a function U : — JR. For any function h : V we 
say h is generated (rationalized) by a utility function U{x) if the bundle h{p, w) uniquely 
maximizes U{x) over the budget B[p, w) for all (p, w) E V. We say h is exhaustive if it 
satisfies the budget equality: p . h{p,w) = lu for all (p,w) E V. Throughout this paper, 
demand functions are all exhaustive unless stated otherwise. 
Let V = 1R++ X R++ and h : dom{h) CV JR'^ be a demand function. Let x ,y 6 JR/+, 
we say that x is directly revealed preferred to y, denoted by xSy, if 
X ^ y a n d G dom{h) s u c h t h a t x = h{p,w) a n d y G B{p,w) 
where B{p, w) = {x E IR+•• P • x < u;} is the budget set. 
We say that h satisfies the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) if S is asym-
metric, i.e. 
(WARP) xSy =>y ISx for all x,y G JR+ 
1 For all x,y e /R', " x � y " means "x,- > y,- for all i" ； and " x > y" means "x,- > yi for all i " . W e denote 
\yy JH'^ - {x £ IR : X > 0}，and /R'^^ = {X G /R' ： X » 0} . The topology of IR' is induced by the Euclidean 
norm ||-||. 
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We say that x is revealed preferred to y, denoted by xS*y^ if 
xSy or xSxiS • • • SxnSy for some x i , • • •, x „ E M'：^ 
That is, S* is the transitive closure of S. We say that h satisfies the Strong Axiom of 
Revealed Preference (SARP) if S is acyclic, i.e. 
(SARP) xS*y ^ y ^x for all e i??+ 
We say that h satisfies the Strong Strong Axiom, of Revealed Preference (SSARP) if 
(SSARP) h satisfies SARP aiicl h{p, w) = h{p', w') (p, w) = ( p , w') 
We say that x is directly revealed homothetically-preferred to y, denoted by xHy, if 
3A > 0 such that \xS\y 
That, is, H is the homothetic closure of S. 
个 个 
V . � 
� 
� 
,• 2y � � . � 2 x 
� / > < � � 
^ ~ > ^ � > 
Fig la. Data Fig lb . x S y => {2x)H{2y) 
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We say that h satisfies the Weak Axiom of Revealed Homothetic Preference (WHA) if 
H is asymmetric, equivalently if 
(WHA) xHy y ^x for all a', y G JR'+ 
We say that x is revealed homothetically-preferred to y, denoted by xH*y^ if 
xHy or xHx\H •. • HxnHy for some x i , • • •, £ JR丨+ 
That is, H* is the transitive closure of H. 
个 八 
\ X H y and y H x 
Fig 2a. Data satisfying W H A Fig 2b. Data not satisfying W H A 
We say that h satisfies the Strong Axiom of Revealed Homothetic Preference (SHA) if 
H is asymmetric, equivalently if 
(SHA) xH*y�y ^x for all x,y G ]R'+ 
Remark 1. Cliiappori and Rochet (1987) proves that if dom{h) is finite, then h is 
rationalizable by smooth preferences if and only if it satisfies SSARP. Following the lines 
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of Varian (1983), Liu and Wong (2000) proves that h is rationalizable by homothetic pref-
erences if and only if it satisfies SHA. To obtain rationalization by smooth and homothetic 
preferences, it is natural to combine the two axioms, as stated below: 
We say that h satisfies the Strong Strong Axiom of Revealed Homothetic Preference 
(SSHA ) if 
(SSHA) h satisfies SHA and h{p, w) = A/i(p'，w') for some \ > {) p = p' 
八 A 
Fig 3a. Data satisfying S H A but not S S H A Fig 3b. Data satislying SSHA 
Theorem. Let h : dom.{h) C V -> be a demand function and let the domain of h be 
finite. Then h satisfies the SSHA if and only if it is rationalizable by a homothetic, smooth, 
strictly monotone and strictly concave utility function. 
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Z \ indifference curve kinked � indifference curve smooth n 
Fig 4a. Data satisfying S U A but not S S I l ^ Fig 41). Data satisfying S S H A , 
Proof. The only if part has been dealt with by Chiappori and Rochet (1987) and Liu 
and Wong (2000) so we will prove the if part here. The construction combines the methods 
used in these two papers. 
The domain of h is finite so let's write dom.{h) = {(P*，tf^ ”}仁i，...’:r，with w^ = p^ • 
h(p\w') and x' = 
SSHA guarantees that if = for some A > 0, then = p^'. Hence if the function 
h{p,w) = h{p, w) for all (p, w) € do7n{h)\{2)'\w^') is rationalizable by a honiothetic utility 
function U, then the original h function is also rationalizable by U. This means that without 
loss of generality we may assume that 
.T^  + Ax'' for all A > 0 and t ^ (1) 
Now h satisfies SHA, which has the following equivalent form, known as the Scalar 
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Axiom (see Liu and Wong (2000) cf. Varian (1983)” : 
3Xt > 0, t = 1, • • •, T such that y^ = 入 a r e unrelated, i.e.: 
� p W < P W ' � 
Note that (1) implies that + y' ' for all t + t', so we have 
<p'- / for all t # t' (3) 
Note that if {( />' ’y ' )}t=i ’…’T is rationalizable by a homothetic utility function U, then U 
also rationalizes { ( p � … ’ T . ^ Hence we only have to construct U which rationalizes 
y ” } t = i •••,T- We will first construct an indifference surface which is "smooth" and "con-
vex" and passes through each and then extend the indifference surface homothetically 
to yield a homothetic, smooth, strictly monotone and strictly concave utility function. 
Let M = max{||y'||^ : t 二 1, •.. ,T}，by (3), there exists e > 0 such that 
O 
p � + -eM < pt . / for all t (4) 
Let q^  = p' + eyt and pick real numbers • • • such that 
+ . = … = + gT . yT = a � 0 (5) 
Define VF : 1R' R by W{y) = min{/3, + . y + : t = 1’ …，T } 
2 S H A also has another equivalent form, known as the Expenditure Axiom. 
3 U rationalizes a set { ( p ' , a : ' ) }£=i , . . . ,T means U rationalizes the demand / i (p ' ,p ' . x ' ) = 
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Note that by (4) and (5), when t + t', 
/ f 3 
< + / •/ + -eM 
< 13ti + / . yt 
Hence'* 
W { y ^ ) = � < + gt. yt + i e l l y ' f in a neighbourhood Ball{y\rjt) of (6) 
Let 7] = mm{r]t : i 二 1，…，T} and define p : R' ^ M, pr, ： M and V : M^ ^ R 
y exp ( m i ^ T ) / f — ( i n ^ - r ) d工 if IMl < 1 
p[x) = I'j 
� 0 otherwise 
⑷ = ( 8 ) 
V{y) = [ W{y-OPv{Od^ (9) 
JlR' 
Note that (cf. Chiappori and Rochet (1987)), V is smooth, concave and strictly monotone. 
Moreover (6)，（7)，(S) and (9) guarantees that 
V{y') = W{i/) and (10) 
4 Ball{y, b) is the open ball: { x 6 /R' : |lx - y|l < 6} 
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DV{y') = qt (11) 
Let S = {y e ： V{y) < a + 1}, and dS = {y G IR'+ : = a + 1} he the 
(relative) boundary of 5, then S is bounded and contains all the points Define a function 
U .. S — Rhy U[y) 二 V"(y)—会 e||y||�Then U is smooth and strictly concave. Moreover, 
since V is strictly monotone, € could be taken to be small enough so that U is still strictly 
monotone in 5 and that U > a + ^m dS. Note that, by (5)，（6)，(10) and (11), it follows 
that for all i, we have: 
= - 丢 * T 
= + yt 
= a for allf 二 1 , . . . , T (12) 
DU{y') = DV{y') 一 q / = q'— ei/ = (13) 
Hence the indifference surface is what we are after. The next step is to extend it 
homothetically. 
Define a function 7 : lR+\{0} R+ implicitly by the following 
U{i{y)y) = a for all y e (14) 
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Then 7 is well-defined^，smooth, strictly monotone and strictly convex'^. 
The function U : 一 股+ defined by 
1 for y ^ 0 
U ( y ) = 袖 、 (15) 
� 0 for y = 0 
is homothetic, smooth, strictly monotone, stricly concave and rationalizes y”}t=i’…’:r. 
Chiappori and Rochet (1987) proves that a finite set of demand data satisfies SSARP 
if and only if it is rationalizable by smooth preferences, while Liu and Wong (2000) proves 
that a set of demand data satisfies SHA if and only if it is rationalizable by homothetic pref-
erences. The theorem shows that these two results could be combined when the conditions 
are combined, namely, if a finite set of demand data satisfies SSHA, then it is rationalizable 
by smooth and homothetic preferences. 
Remark 2. If equation (15) is replaced by 
‘ f o r y 0 
my) = 7 ⑷ 
0 for y = 0 
Then instead of strict concavity, we will have weak concavity and first degree homogeneity. 
5 Because t / (0 ) < 0 and U is strictly monotone while a > 0. 
6 Since U is smooth, strictly monotone and strictly concave. 
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Chapter 4 
Excess Demand and Homothetic Economy 
I. Introduction 
The notion of homotheticity is important in economic theory. For example, in producer 
theory, homotheticity appears in production functions with scale returns. In demand theory, 
it is well known that homothetic preferences generate linear income expansion paths. Ho-
motheticity of preferences is important because it is assumed in certain important works of 
aggregation problems (cf. Antonelli (1886), Chipman (1970), Gorman (1953)), trade theory 
(cf. Chipman (1965,1974)) and of price and quantity indexes (cf. Diewert (1993)). It is also 
widely used in empirical econometrics (cf. Diewert (1993)，Mas-Colell et al. (1995)). 
One problem of interest is to characterize continuous excess demand functions by ho-
mothetic preferences. Mantel (1976) has shown that when the excess demand function has 
bounded second order partial derivatives, then it could be characterized by homothetic pref-
erences. However, the condition on which his result is based is strong, and it may not be 
necessary. Sonnenschein (1972, 1973), Mantel (1974), Debreu (1974), Mas-Colell (1977), 
and others derived characterizations under different requirements of price sets and prefer-
ences. However, homotheticity of preferences could not be satisfied. In theorem 1 below, we 
will show that when the price set is positive and finite, then the excess demand function is 
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characterized by homothetic and smooth preferences. The finite case is important because 
it provides the necessary background for empirical testing, our result imposes no restrictions 
on the excess demand function and so for any set of empirical excess demand data, it is 
always characterizable by homothetic and smooth, preferences. If the price set is infinite, 
then in general, this is not true, as theorem 2 below shows. So the question lies in finding 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for an excess demand function to be characterizable 
by homothetic preferences. The sufficient condition proposed by Mantel (1976) is iinsatis-
factory because it is too strong, stronger than necessary. In theorem 3 below, we will try to 
propose a weaker sufficient condition. We could only prove that the condition is sufficient for 
the two-dimensional case, so whether this condition is really sufficient for multi-dimensional 
cases is still an open question. 
The main technical innovation lies in the reduction of the multi-dimensional case to a 
two-dimensional one. The reason for doing so is that for the two-dimensional case, SHA is 
equivalent to WHA (cf. Liu and Wong (2000))，which is much easier to test. 
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II. Results 
The commodity space is IR'+, the price space is the price-income space is V = 
X 1 A budget set is a set B{p,iu) == { t G ： p • x < w}, where {p, -w) G V. 
A utility function is a function U : 1R\. — IR. For any function h : V we 
say h is generated (rationalized) by a utility function U{x) if the bundle h{p,iv) uniquely 
maximizes U{x) over the budget B[p,w) for all (p,w) 6 V. We say h is exhaustive if it 
satisfies the budget equality: p . h(p,w) = w for all {p,w) G Throughout this paper, 
demand functions are all exhaustive unless stated otherwise. 
Let G C An excess demand function is a continuous function C ： G iR' with 
the following properties: 
WL) p . C(P) = 0 for every peG 
H) ( (p) = ((Ap) for every p G G and every A > 0 with 入p e G 
BB) C(G) + g � 0 for some � 0 e 
1 For all x , j / G /R', "2； » y” means "z,- > y,. for all i " ; and " i > y" means "x,- > y,- for all i". W e denote 




Fig la. Excess demand function Fig lb . Locus of excess demand function in 2 D space 
We now give our main result: 
Theorem 1 (Finite case). Let G C be Suite and ( : G JR' be an excess demand 
function. Then there exists endowments tu�,• -.,to' and utility functions ,U' which 
are homothetic, smooth, strictly monotone and strictly concave such that the individual 
excess demand functions sum up to That is, if • • •, h' are generated by U��…,IJi 
respectively, then the individual excess demand functions are C = — w' and = 
c(p) for all p e G. 
Remark 1. The proof is based on Strong Strong Axiom of Revealed Homothetic Pref-
erence (SSHA), which is a combination of the Strong Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference 
(SSARP) (cf. Chiappori and Rochet 1987) and the Strong Axiom of Revealed Homothetic 
Preference (SHA) (cf. Liu and Wong 2000). We will show that if a finite set of price-purchase 
data satisfies SSHA, then it is rationalizable by a smooth and homothetic utility function. 
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Details of the SSHA and the proof of Theorem 1 will be given in part III. 
Remark 2. The result of theorem 1 shows that the problem of rationalizing an economy 
excess demand function by homothetic preferences is completely solved when the domain 
of excess demand function is finite. This provides us with the background for empirical 
testing, because we could only obtain finite data sets. Note that no restrictions have been 
imposed on the excess demand function in theorem 1，which means that any real world 
excess demand data could be rationalized by smooth and homothetic preferences. 
Remark 3 . If the domain of the excess demand function is infinite, then in general it 
is not rationalizable by homothetic preferences, as theorem 2 below shows: 
Theorem 2. Let P = { ( l , p ) G : p > 0} to be a normalization of Define 
‘ 2p for p e (0，1) 
C i ( i , p ) = p - p V p ^ + 1 forpe [1,2) (1) 
‘ 1 for p e [2, CO) 
. - 2 f o r p G (0,1) 
C2(1,P)= “ for pe [1,2) (2) 
- - for p e [2,oo) 
P 
Then C = (Ci，C2) is an excess demand function which is not rationalizable by homothetic 
preferences. I.e. there does not exist homothetic utility functions U^ • •, U"' which 
generates excess demand functions that sum up to (. 
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A 
Fig 2. Locus of ^ 
Remark 4. The proof is straightforward and will be given in part III. 
Remark 5. Theorem 2 shows that in general an excess demand function cannot be 
rationalized by homothetic preferences, this leaves us with a question of finding the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for an excess demand function to be rationalizable by homothetic 
preferences. Mantel (1976) shows that a sufficient condition is that the excess demand 
function has bounded second order partial derivatives. His assumption is strong in the 
sense that zero or even negative prices are allowed, a drawback is that the condition may 
not be a necessary condition. In tlieorern 3 below we will try to propose a weaker sufficient 
condition. 
Theorem 3. Let P = {(Pi,2)2) G : Pi + P2 = 1} be a normalization of and 
C ： JR++ �2 be an excess demand function that satisfies a Lipschitz condition in IP, 
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namely: 
IIC(p) - C(p')ll < A Hp - p'll for all p,p' e F for some A > 0 (3) 
then C is rationalizahlc by homothetic preferences. 
Remark 6. Theorem 3 deals with the two-dimensional space only. The proof follows 
the same line of reasoning as the proof of theorem 1 and will be given in part III. However, 
the proof could not be generalized to multidimensional cases and so whether the Lipschitz 
condition is a sufficient condition remains an open question. 
Remark 7. The example given in theorem 2 could not satisfy this condition. However, 
a slight modification of the example^ will give an excess demand function that is rational-
izable by homothetic preferences, but it still doesn't satisfy the condition in theorem 3. 
Therefore the Lipschitz condition is again a sufficient but not a necessary condition for 
two-dimensional spaces. 
2 An example is the following: 
‘ 2p for p G (0’ 1) 
‘ � ( l，p ) = + for p e [1,2) 
為 一 [2’�o) 
and C = , —Ci/p)- It is trivial to show that the demand function / i ( l ,p) = C(1’P) + (0，8) satisfies W H A 
and hence S H A (see remark 8 below), so h is rationalizable by a homothetic preference, but (； does not 
satisfy the Lipschitz condition. 
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III. Proofs 
The proof of theorem 1 utilizes the SSHA developed in Chapter 3. It also uses the well 
known that when 1 = 2, WARP is equivalent to SARP; and WHA is equivalent to SHA. 
P r o o f o f T h e o r e m 1. G is finite so let G = E : f 二 1, - . .，T}. 
Choose real numbers x i , • • •, Xf > 0 such that each of the lines 
丄1 = { ( -a : i ( l 一 w)”T2W’. . • ,;r7’w) e ]R' : 0 < u < 1} 
LT = {(ari u,. •. ’ :r:r-iw, _a’:r(l — M)) G iR' ： 0 < < 1} 
intersect each of the planes 
pi = {rc e 贝‘：pi . 0； 二 0} 
p'^ = [x e m^ -x = 0} 
at distinct points^. Denote by y''-* the intersection of U and PK 
^ pi 
V P2 
Fig 3a. U and P ^ , 2 D view Fig 3b. U and 产 ’ 3 P view 
3 It is possible because there are only finitely many plaues, 
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Note that along a line L', one can arrange y ' � s u c h that 
y*丄 « « • • • « y � j T (4) 
Along a plane P-* ’ we have the following 
yi’）+ y2’J. + … + y T � = 0 (5) 
and that , , . . . ’ spans P-'^. Hence we can write 
C(p".) = yi，j + … + CCTJ yT’j for all j = 1，..., T (6) 
By (4) and (6)，there exists a large N > 0 such that for all i = 1, • • • , T 
N y � j i + a i j , y � j i « • • • < iVy'’打 + y'_，分 (7) 
Define C' : G — iR' for i = 1，…’ T by 
= + y'''' (8) 
Then each are excess demand functions, moreover, they sum up to 
T T T 
E 彻 ) = � v E ！ > ’ " 。 . 
i=z 1 i = l i = l 
= W ) (by (5) and (6)) 
So we could think of each C as individual excess demand functions for T individuals. The 
next step is to find endowments w* for each individual so that the function : G —>• IB} 
defined by = C ' V ) + � ' s a t i s f i e s SSHA. 
4 Since ( - x i , 0, • • •, 0), • • •, (0, • • •, 0, - i r ) spans JR' and is the projection of ( 0 ’ . . . ’ 0’ - x . - . O , • • •, 0) 
on PJ along the direction of ( i i , • • •, xt)-
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Note that 丨(p^) < 0 and 
(c； (P^.),... , d - i d+ i (p 勺 , . . . ’ c w ) ) = ， . . .，A- i , -T i+i , . . . , o^T) (9) 
for some j > 0. 
Define q''-' 二 p � a n d 二（pi,…，pj-i, pj+i, • • • • (x i , • • •, :Ci_i, Xi+i , . . .，xr) , then 
P^ . C(l^) = (Q ' ’V ' ’ J ) • = 0 (10) 
- j f � � 、 
M 
Fig 4. Reduction into 2D view 
Hence if we could find an endowment =(‘⑴‘”切。G 1R\ such that the price purchase 
data + + «4))}j=i，...，T satisfies SSHA, then the original data 
{(pJ, C'(pJ) + (t^-Ti, • • •, , tyj, r • •, w'2^t))}<=i,- ,T also satisfies SSHA. So the 
problem is now reduced to a 2-dimensional case. The advantage of the 2-dimensional case 
is that SHA (and hence SSHA) is much easier to check, as W H A is equivalent to SHA 
in the 2-dimensional case (see remark 8 above). The following lemma deals with the two 
dimensional case: 
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Lemma. Given a finite set of excess demand data {(p*, :i“)}<=i，…，t where p^. x^ 二 0. With 
ar'i < 0 and rr^  > 0 for all i = 1, • •., T 
(11) 
� � . . . � 
Then there exists a real number io\ such that the demand data + (,�i’0)}/=i’…’r 
satisfies SSHA. 
WHA not satisfied WHA satisfied 
Fig 5a. Data Fig 5b. Small W i Fig 5c. Large lUi 
Remark 11. Note that by (7), we could arrange such that, 
cip''}« cip^n « • • • « cip'n (12) 
i.e. (C ‘ (p力, i^ i j J�…�（C‘ (P知 ) , / 3 i， jT ) (13) 
Hence by (9) and (13), if we take 二 (q''^', r 仏 ) a n d x*'' 二 )，队’h)’ then (11) holds. 
So what is left is the proof of the lemma. 
Proof of Lemma. Define 
= max I ^ I I L ^ 4 - a;； i + 1 (14) 
I字 j — J 
and ;y' = + w^x^) (15) 
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Now we are going to prove that the data set { ( / / ， s a t i s f i e s SSHA. 
Note that if = Xy^ for some A > 0 and i • ]�then 
过 = y j -yj 
y-i lA - yi 
x'l - r j ： • 
玲比 1 二 —i J — 
X'-) 一 X 2 
contradicting (14), hence (14) implies that none of the y "s are on the same ray, so to 
prove that {(p*，y”}f=i ’-" ’r satisfies SSHA, we only need to prove that it satisfies SHA. 
Furthermore, we only need to show that it satisfies WHA because the dimension is 2 (see 
remark 8). 
To prove that {(p'，y”}t=i’…’:r satisfies WHA, we only need to prove that for all � y i , 
there exists 入 > 0 such that y' and Ay-' are unrelated, i.e.: 
• < p' • {\y') and p^ . ( . V ) < p W (16) 
By (14), we could prove that^ 
Hence if we take A = (p' . y ' ) / (p ' . then we have 
• = • ( V ) and pj • ( V ) < p W (18) 
So we could take A to be a bit bigger than A and (16) holds. This proves the lemma. 
5 Using (14) , we have yijy{ > y i / y j . Using also that • = 0’ we have p\ /pi > p'^/po- Using these 
two facts to prove (17) is trivial. 
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R e m a r k 12. The heart of the proof of proposition 1 is the reduction into 2-dimensional 
space. The key step which leads to this is the first step: the choosing of X('s, which could 
not be generalized to the case when the domain of excess demand function is infinite. 
R e m a r k 13. Note that (7) and (14) lead us to individuals that have a huge amount 
of endowment and a huge amount of demand and excess demand, but when the excess 
demands of the individuals sum up, the resultant economy excess demand is small. Which 
means that the economy is nearly at equilibrium when the prices axe at p .^ 
P r o o f o f Theorem 2. Suppose that there exists excess demand functions ’ C?，•••，C": 
iP — s u c h that 
Ci(l，p) + + ••• + r ( l ’ P ) = C(l,p) for all P > 0 (19) 
In order to prove that there does not exist any endowment lu ,^ ly^, • • • such that all 
+ , (.2 + •1^2’..., (n + rationalizable by homothetic preferences, we only need to 
show that + lyi ’ + u;2，•.., (n could not satisfy SHA simultaneously. This is what we 
will prove below. 
Since 1) = 2 > 0, one of C{(1,1) must be positive, WLOG assume 
C ; ( 1 ’ 1 ) > 0 (20) 
If all of Cf(l , I ) , - - - , Cr(l，1) > 0, then by (1), (2) and (19)， 
there exists k with 1 < k < n such that ( f (1,1) > Cf ( l ,2 ) 
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when this happens, WHA cannot be satisfied no matter what value of w^ is chosen®. 
A A 
V L ^ ^ 
Fig 6a, Individual excess demand Fig 6b. W H A cannot be satisfied 
Hence some of Cl(l, 1) < 0, WLOG let 




c J ( i , i ) + . . . + c r ' ( i , i ) = ^ > o (22) 
Consider f[p) 二 — ^ ^ - 1. Note that lim,,—丄十 f'{p) = +oo . Hence 
3po > 1 such that / (po ) > / ( I ) 
\/po 一 1 _ --——1 - ( - — ) > - 2 - ( -x-o) 
Pi) P 
^ C 2 ( l , P o ) - ( - - ) > Ci(l , l ) (by (1), (2)) (23) 
P t = m + l 




6 W e will have (C^-(l,2) + (1 ,2 ) + > + 1) + "；f), when this happens, 
W H A cannot be satisfied for individual k. 
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in order that WHA could possibly hold'. Tliis together with the fact that is an excess 




Using (19)，（23) and (25), we have 
n m 
C2(1,PO) = C2(1,PO)-X!C2(1,PO) 
i=m-f-l 1=1 
> C 2 ( l , P 0 ) - ( - - ) 
PO 
> E C“l，l) (26) 
i = m + l 
In particular, there exists k with m + 1 < k < n such that 
C2'(1，Po)>C!(U) 
When this happens, WHA could not hold® . This proves theorem 2. 
Remark 14. The key step in the proof is on equation (23)，which arises because 
C has unbounded partial derivatives. This leads us to the conjecture that the Lipschitz 
condition may be a necessary and sufficient condition. However, remark 7 shows that it is 
not a necessary condition, and we could prove that it is a sufficient condition oaly in the 
2-dimensional case. 
7 Otherwise, there will be a k < m such that Cf (1 . 1) > C f l l . P o ) and the situation as in footnote 11 
occurs. 
8 T h e reason is the same as that in footnote 11. 
91 
Proof of theorem 3. Let P = { (pi ’p2) £ ： Pi +P2 = 1} be a normalization of 
沢 D e f i n e 
(l[Pl,P2) = 2Ap2 + Cl(PuP2) 
C2bl,P2) = -2Api +(2(Pl ’P2) 
(27) 
C?(Pl,P2) = 一 2 久P2 
cl(Pi，P2) = where (pupo) 6 F 
Then ‘ ] and are excess demand functions that sum up to Now we are going to find 
endowments l u ^ i w ^ � 0 such that the demand functions C^  + .�工 and C^  satisfy WHA. 
We will first prove a relation that is analogous to equation (11) and then use similar steps 
as in the proof of the lemma to find w^ and w^. 
Let p^p' e P, WLOG let p^ > p2 (so p[ < pi). By (3), we have 
IIC(p')-C(p)ll<A||p'-p|| 
IICi(p') - Ci(p)ll < + 
= y/2X{p'^-p2) (28) 
Using (27) and (28)，we have 
0 < ( 2 - ^ / 2 ) X { p ' 2 - P 2 ) < Cf(p ' i ,P2) - C;(Pi，P2) < ( 2 + - P 2 ) (29) 
Similarly, we have 
0 < ( 2 - -p\) < C2(p'i,P2)-C2(Pi,P2) < (2 -f V2)X{pi - p\) (30) 
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Combining (29) and (30)，we have 
< CMK，p(2)-CHPI，P‘2) < 2 ^ 7 ! ( 叫 
The same is true for (2，more precisely: 
Clb'l’P&)-C|(Pl，P'2) — 1 . . . . 
Equations (31) and (32) are analogous to equation (11) in the lemma. 
Now (3) guarantees that is bounded, (27) implies that is also bounded, let the 
bound be M > 0: 
||C'(p)|| < M f o r a U p G i P (33) 
Note that by (27), C^  is bounded by 2A. Define 
\ 2 - V 2 ) (34) 
= (2A + 1，0) 
Equation (34) is analogous to equation (14) in the lemma. And we simply follow the same 
line of argument in the proof of the lemma to prove that + and + 'uP' satisfies SHA^ 
10. 
Remark 15. The proof relies heavily on the arguments in the lemma, which applies 
only to the two dimensional case. This makes the generalization into higher dimensions 
9 More precisely, if we let y^ = C^ (p) + , y � = + and = (;2(p) + ^ ； 2 ， : (：!(力 + 访 2 , 
then we will have j ^ / y } > y ^ ' / y } ' . y\b\ > ly\' and v\lvi > P[/p'2. then (17) could be proved. 
Actually S S H A could be satisfied, but this time the domain of C is infinite so we could not obtain 
smoothness of utility function as in the lemma. 
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difficult, so whether the Lipschitz condition is also sufficient for higher dimensions remains 




In this paper, we have obtained the following results: 
(1) When a finite set of price-consumption data satisfies SARP, then it is rationalizable by 
a utility function that is continuous, strictly monotone and strictly concave, inoreover， 
the (Marshall!an and Hicksian) demand functions it generates are smooth. The converse 
is also true, because if the price-consumption data cannot satisfy SARP, then it cannot 
be rationalized by preferences. (See Chpater 2’ Theorem 1) 
(2) When a finite set of price-consumption data satisfies SSHA, then it is rationalizable by 
a utility function that is smooth, homothetic, strictly monotone and strictly concave. 
The converse is also true, if the price-consumption data cannot satisfy SSHA, then the 
rationalizing utility function is either not smooth or not homothetic. (See Chpater 3, 
Theorem) 
(3) Given any finite set of economy excess demand data, we could always construct an 
underlying economy which is composed of agents that have smooth, homothetic, strictly 
monotone and strictly concave utility functions. (See Chpater 4, Theorem 1) 
(4) When the economy excess demand data is infinite, then in general it is not true. More 
precisely, we could find an economy excess demand function with infinite domain such 
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that the underlying economy is not possible to be composed of agents with homothetic 
preferences. (See Chpater 4’ Theorem 2) 
(5) If there are only two commodities and the excess demand function satisfies a Lipschitz 
condition, then it is possible to construct an economy with agents that have homothetic 
preferences. (See Chpater 4，Theorem 3) 
Result (1) strengthens the results of Matzkin and Richter (1991) and Chiappori and 
Rochet (1987) by obtaining a smooth demand function using only the standard Strong 
Axiom of Revealed Preference, not using the stronger axioms (cf. Chiappori and Rochet 
(1987)). It also shows that that SARP is exactly what we need to extract a smooth demand 
function from a finite data set of price-purchase observations. 
Result (2) combines the previous results in revealed preference theory about obtaining 
a smooth utility generator (cf. Chiappori and Rochet (1987)) and obtaining a homothetic 
utility generator (cf. Varian (1983), Liu and Wong (2000)). 
Result (3) is an application of result (2), it strengthen the result of Mantel (1976) by 
obtaining both smoothness and strict monotonicity for the utility function of agents in an 
economy. 
Results (1), (2) and (3) deal with the finite case, they provide the necessary background 
for empirical studies. 
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Results (4) and (5) deal with the infinite case. While result (4) shows that in general 
an excess demand function with infinite domain cannot be rationalized by economies with 
homothetic preferences, result (5) leads to conjecture a necessary condition for the possible 
rationalization by homothetic economies. These two results pinpoints a direction for possible 
future research, the complete answer is the necessary and sufficient condition on the excess 
demand function for it to be rationalizable by homothetic economies. Mantel (1976) provides 
a sufficient condition that is stronger than necessary, result (5) provides weaker condition 




Validating SARP by computer programs 
In this chapter, we will develop a few programs to check whether a data set satisfies 
SARP. Once the algorithm has been developed it could be modified easily to check SHA. 
Adding a simple routine could also check SSARP and SSHA. These programs could be used 
ill an actual empirical test. 
I. The Relationship Matrix Algorithm 
To check whether a data set satisfies SARP is the same as checking whether the S 
relationship is acyclic. For example, if 
x^Sx^Sx^Sx^Sx} 
then this data set does not satisfy SARP. Note that if you start at ar^  and then move to 
another bundle which x^ is revealed preferred to, and then move on to another bundle in 
the same fashion, it is possible to reach x^ again in four steps. This is the basic idea in this 
algorithm. 
Create a relationship matrix (oij) so that 
' 1 i ix 'Sx^ 
o-ij =‘ 
� 0 otherwise 
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For example, the following is a relationship matrix: 
/ O 1 1\ 
0 0 1 
1 oj 
This matrix is to be understood in this way: aio = 1 means that there is one way to go 
from x^ to x^ in one step. The square of it yields 
/ I 1 1\ 
1 1 0 
乂 0 1 2) 
033 = 2 means that there are two ways to go from x^ to x^ in two steps (two ways because 
«33 = 2，two steps because the relationship matrix is raised to the second power), it is easy 
to find that they are x^Sx^Sx'^ and x'^Sx^Sx^ respectively. Thus SARP is not satisfied. So 
to check SARP, one could create the relationship matrix and raise it to to high powers and 
check whether the diagonal is all zero. How high is enough? If there are T bundles (so the 
matrix is of T by T) , then raise to power T is enough. Because if could go back to itself, 
then it could always do so in less than or equal to T steps. 
This algorithm executes in polynomial time, thus it is regarded as computable. The 
calculation of every p' . x^ requires n multiplications and n — I additions (where n is the 
number of commodities), totaling 2n - 1 calculations. So the calculation of each entry in 
the relationship matrix requires 4n - 2 calculations and 1 comparison, if we assume that the 
time required to do a comparison is the same as the time needed to do a calculation, then 
it takes 4n — 1 calculation time. Thus the calculation of the relationship matrix requires 
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T.2(4n — 1) calculation time. If we assume that T � n then the calculation time is of order 
T2. Multiplying two T by T matrices together requires the calculation of T'^  entries, each 
taking 2T — 1 calculations, so the calculation of the square of the relationship matrix takes 
0{T^) calculation time. So the calculation of the Tth power of the relationship matrix 
requires 0 { T ^ ) calculation time. This estimation ignores the need to copy memory bits 
and the checking of the diagonals, anyway we could say that the time needed for the whole 
algorithm is of order about T'^. 
II. The Relationship Matrix Algorithm (Modified Version 1) 
A possible improvement of the relationship matrix algorithm comes from the fact that 
we don't care whether there are 2 ways to go from x* to x^ or there are 3，we only need to 
know that there is a way to go. Thus in the relationship matrix and its respective powers, 
we only need to have 1 or 0 in their entries. This not only reduces memory requirement but 
also improves calculation time. Roughly, this algorithm's execution time is of order T^. 
III. The Relationship Matrix Algorithm (Modified Version 2) 
Redefine the relationship matrix such that the diagonal is always equal to 1. Then 
instead of checking whether the diagonals of the powers of the relationship matrix is non-
zero, we check whether they are larger than 1. Now if could go back to itself in n steps, 
then it could also do it in n + 1,n + 2, n + 3 etc. steps (this is not true in the previous 
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version of the relationship matrix). Hence we don't need to calculate the second, and then 
third, and then fourth etc. powers of the relationship matrix, but we only need to square the 
resultant every time and calculate the second, fourth, eighth etc. powers of the relationship 
matrix and check whether the diagonal is larger than 1. Now we don't need to calculate 
multiplications of T by T matrices T times but only need to calculate about log(T) times, 
so the order of execution time is reduced to about T^ log(r ) . 
IV . The Depth First Search Algorithm 
There are two disadvantages of the relationship matrix algorithm, one is that it is slow, 
the other is that it couldn't tell what the loop looks like. That is, we only know that x'S 
something Sx\ but not x^Sx^Sx''Sx^ for example. The depth first search algorithm is more 
efficient and could let us know how the loop looks. 
Start at move to another bundle that is revealed preferred to, say ar^ , move to 
another bundle in the same fashion and we will create a path, say x^ Sx'^Sx^Sx'^. If x^Sx^, 
then we could instantly see that there is a loop: x"^  Sx^ Sx'^ Sx"^. If there is nothing that 
x'^  is revealed preferred to, then move back to x^，its parent in the path, and find another 
bundle which it is revealed preferred to. Continue with this search we will eventually find a 
loop or exhaust all the bundles. The order of execution time is roughly T'^. 
V . Experiments with the Four Algorithms 
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Actual programs have been written in C + + to test the efficiency of these algorithms, 
ill this test they are used to check two sets of data, one satisfies SARP while the other is 
randomly generated and doesn't satisfy SARP. Both sets of data contains 100 commodities 
and 100 bundles. The computer that is used to run the programs has an Intel Pentium III 
600 MHz processor with 256 MB RAM. The result is summarized in the following tables: 
Execution time for checking that a set of data satisfies SARP. 
Algorithm Time in seconds 
Relationship Matrix 5.117 
Relationship Matrix Modified 1 2.143 
Relationship Matrix Modified 2 0.29 
Depth First Search 0.13 
Execution time for checking that a set of data does not satisfy SARP. 
Algorithm Time in seconds 
Relationship Matrix 2.29 
Relationship Matrix Modified 1 1.26 
Relationship Matrix Modified 2 0.25 
Depth First Search 0.09 
102 
Program Listing of the Relationship Matrix Algorithm (Modified 1) 
# i n c l u d e < i o s t r e a m . h > 
#inc:lude < f s t r e a m , h > 
# i n c l u d e < t i m e , h > 
u n s i g n e d long g N o O f C o m m o d ; 
u n s i g n e d long g N o O f B u n d l e s ; 
d o u b l e • g D a t a M a t r i x ; 
u n s i g n e d long • g R e l a t i o n M a t r i x ; 
i n t r e a d F i l e ( c o n s t char* f i l e n a m e ) ; 
i n t c r e a t e R e l a t i o n M a t r i x ( ) ; 
d o u b l e p r i c e D o t B u n d l e ( u n s i g n e d long p r i c e l n d e x , u n s i g n e d long b u n d l e I n d e x ) ; 
int chec)cLoop《）； 
v o i d m u l t i p l y M a t r i c e s ( u n s i g n e d long* A, u n s i g n e d long* B, u n s i g n e d long* r e s u l t ) ; 
i n t c h e c k D i a g o n a l ( u n s i g n e d long* a M a t r i x ) ; 
i n t m a i n ( i n t a r g c , c o n s t char • a r g v ⑴ { 
int c h e c k R e s u l t = 0; 
clock一t s t a r t T i m e , e n d T i m e ; 
s t a r t T i m e = c l o c k ( ) ; 
i f ( a r g c < = l ) { 
cerr « "Usage: “ « argv[0] « “ data f i l e " « endl; 
r e t u r n 1; 
i f ( r e a d F i l e ( a r g v [ l ] ) ) { 
r e t u r n 1; 
i f ( c r e a t e R e l a t i o n M a t r i x ( ) )【 
r e t u r n 1; 
d e l e t e [] g D a t a M a t r i x ; 
c h e c k R e s u l t = c h e c k L o o p ( ) ; 
if (checkResult===l) { 
c o u t « "SARP is n o t s a t i s f i e d for this set of data." « endl; 
} e l s e i f ( c h e c k R e s u l t = = 0 ) { 
c o u t « "SARP is s a t i s f i e d for this set of data." « endl; 
) e l s e { 
d e l e t e [] g R e l a t i o n M a t r i x ; 
r e t u r n 1; 
} 
d e l e t e [] g R e l a t i o n M a t r i x ; 
e n d T i m e = c l o c k ( ) ; 
c o u t « " E l a s p e d t i m e = “ << (double)(endTime - startTime)/CLOCKS一PER一SEC 
<< “seconds.“ << endl; 
r e t u r n 0; 
} 
int readFile(const char* filename) { 
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char aChar; 
unsigned long noOfCols = 0; 
unsigned long noOfRows = 0; 
ifstream dataFile(filename); 
unsigned long i = 0; 
if (dataFile.failO ) { 
cerr << "Cannot open file, make sure that the file name is correct 
and it is not used by another program.“ << endl; 
return 1; 
} 










if(no0fcols==0 丨丨 noOfCols/2*2 ！= noOfCols) { 
cerr « "Invalid file format, the number of prices and the number 
of commodities are not the same." « endl; 
return 1; 
} 










cerr « "Invalid file format, there is only one price purchase 
data." « endl; 
return 1; 
} 
gNoOfBundles = noOfRows; 
gNoOfCommod = noOfCols/2; 
/ * 
do { 
cout « "There are “ « gNoOfBundles « “ price purchase data with 
“ « gNoOfCommod « “ commodities, proceed? [ y / n ] " ; 
cin » aChar; 
) w h i l e ( a C h a r ! = ' y ' && aChar!=’Y' && aChar!='n' && aChar！='N'); 




gDataMatrix = new double[noOfRows*noOfCols]; 
if(！gDataMatrix) { 






while(！dataFile.eof() && i<noOfRows*noOfCols) { 




cerr « "Invalid file format, it m u s t be a tab delimited text file 
with each line representing a price purchase data, the first n numbers m u s t be the 





int createRelationMatrix() { 
unsigned long i, j; 
double income; 
gRelationMatrix = new unsigned long[gNoOfBundles*gNoOfBundles]; 
if(!gRelationMatrix) { 




income = priceDotBundle(i,i); 
for(j=0;j<gNoOfBundles;j++) { 
if(i==j) { 
gRelationMatrix[i*gNoOfBundles+j] = 0; 
} else { 
if(income >= priceDotBundle(i,j)) { 
gRelationMatrix[i*gNoOfBundles+j] = 1; 
} else { 







d o u b l e p r i c e D o t B u n d l e ( u n s i g n e d long pricelndex, unsigned long b u n d l e l n d e x ) ( 
u n s i g n e d long i; 
double returnValue = 0; 
for (i=0 ； K g N o O f C o m m o d ; i++) { 
returnValue += gDataMatrix [priceIndex*gNoOfComniod*2 + i] * 




int checkLoop() { 
unsigned long •tempMatrix[2]; 
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unsigned long power = 2; 
tempMatrix[0] = new unsigned long[gNoOfBundles*gNoOfBundles]; 
if(！tempMatrix[OJ) { 
cerr « "Cannot allocate memory" « endl; 
return -1; 
) 
tempMatrix[1] = new unsigned long[gNoOfBundles*gNoOfBundles]; 
if(!tempMatrix[1]) { 
cerr « "Cannot allocate memory" << endl; 
delete [] tempMatrix[0]; 
return -1; 
} 
multiplyMatrices(gRelationMatrix, gRelationMatrix, tempMatrix[0]); 











delete [] tempMatrix[0]; 
delete [] tempMatrix[1]; 
return 0; 
} 
v o i d m u l t i p l y M a t r i c e s ( u n s i g n e d long* A , unsigned long* B, unsigned long* result) { 
unsigned long i, j, k; 
for (i=0 ； K g N o O f B u n d l e s ； i++) { 
for(j =0;j <gNoOfBundles;j ++)【 
result[i*gNoOfBundles+j] = 0; 
for(k=0;k<gNoOfBundles;k++) { 
result[i*gNoOfBundles+j] += 





int c h e c k D i a g o n a l ( u n s i g n e d long* aMatrix) { 













unsigned long gNoOfCommod; 
u n s i g n e d long gNoOfBundles; 
d o u b l e *gDataMatrix; 
u n s i g n e d char •gRelationMatrix; 
int readFile(const char* filename); 
int createRelationMatrix(); 
d o u b l e priceDotBundle(unsigned long pricelndex, unsigned long bundleIndex); 
int checkLoopI); 
v o i d m u l t i p l y M a t r i c e s ( u n s i g n e d char* A, unsigned char* B, unsigned char* result); 
int checkDiagonal(unsigned char* aMatrix); 
int m a i n ( i n t argc, const char *argv[]) { 
int checkResult = 0; 
clock_t startTime, endTime; 
startTime = clock(); 
if(argc<=l) { 






delete [] gDataMatrix; 
c h e c k R e s u l t = checkLoop(); 
if (chec)cResult==l) { 
cout « "SARP is not satisfied for this set of data." « endl; 
) e l s e if(checkResult==0) { 
cout « "SARP is satisfied for this set of data." « endl; 
} else { 
delete [] gRelationMatrix; 
return 1; 
} 
delete [] gRelationMatrix; 
endTime = clock(); 
cout « "Elasped time = “ « (double)(endTime - startTime)/CLOCKS—PER一SEC 
<< “sec o n d s . " << endl; 
return 0; 
) 
int readFile(const char* filename) { 
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char aChar； 
u n s i g n e d long noOfCols = 0; 
u n s i g n e d long noOfRows = 0; 
i f s t r e a m dataFile(filename); 
u n s i g n e d long i = 0; 
i f ( d a t a F i l e . f a i l ( ) ) { 
cerr << "Cannot open file, make sure that the file name is c o r r e c t 
and it is n o t u s e d by another program.“ « endl; 
return 1; 
} 










i f ( n o 0 f c o l s = = 0 II noOfCols/2*2 ！= noOfCols) { 
cerr « "Invalid file format, the number of prices and the number 
of c o m m o d i t i e s are not the same." << endl; 
return 1; 
) 
w h i l e ( d a t a F i l e . p e e k 0！=EOF) { 





i f ( a C h a r ! = ' \ n ' ) { 
noOfRows++; 
) 
i f ( n o O f R o w s = = l ) { 
cerr « "Invalid file format, there is only one price p u r c h a s e 
d a t a . " « endl; 
return 1; 
) 
gNoOfBundles = noOfRows; 
gNoOfConunod = noOfCols/2; 
do { 
c o u t « "There are “ « gN o O f B u n d l e s « “ price purchase data with 
“< < g N o O f C o m m o d « “ comm o d i t i e s , proceed? [ y / n ] " ; 
cin » aChar; 
) w h i l e ( a C h a r ! = ' y ' && a C h a r ! = i Y ' && aChar!=’n’ && aChar!='N'); 




g D a t a M a t r i x = n e w d o u b l e [ n o O f R o w s * n o O f C o l s ] ; 
if(IgDataMatrix) { 
cerr << "Cannot allocate m e m o r y " << endl; 





while ( ！dataFile.eof() “ i<noOfRows*noOfCo:Ls)( 




cerr « "Invalid file format, it must be a tab delimited text file 
w i t h each line representing a price purchase data, the first n numbers m u s t be the 





int createRelationMatrix() { 
unsigned long i, j； 
double income; 
gRelationMatrix = new unsigned char[gNoOfBundles*gNoOfBundles]; 
if(！gRelationMatrix) { 




income = priceDotBundle(i,i); 
for(j=0;j<gNoOfBundles;j++) { 
if(i==j) { 
gRelationMatrix[i*gNoOfBundles+j] = 0; 
} else � 
if(income >= priceDotBundle(i,j)) { 
gRelationMatrix[i*gNoOfBundles+j] = 1; 
) e l s e { 







d o u b l e p r i c e D o t B u n d l e ( u n s i g n e d long pricelndex, unsigned long bundlelndex) { 
u n s i g n e d long i; 
d o u b l e returnValue = 0; 
for (i=0; KgNoOfCoimtiod; i++) { 
returnValue += gDataMatrix[pr;LceIndex*gNoOfCommod*2 + i] • 




int checkLoop{) { 
unsigned char *tempMatrix[2]; 
unsigned long power = 2; 
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tempMatrix[0] = new unsigned char[gNoOfBundles*gNoOfBundles]; 
if(!tempMatrix[0]) { 
cerr << "Cannot allocate memory" « endl; 
return -1; 
} 
tempMatrix[1] = new unsigned char[gNoOfBundles*gNoOfBundles]; 
if(!tempMatrix[1]) { 
cerr « "Cannot allocate memory" « endl; 
delete [] tempMatrix[0]; 
return -1; 
) 
multiplyMatrices(gRelationMatrix, gRelationMatrix, tempMatrix[0]); 











delete [] tempMatrix[0]; 
delete [] tempMatrix[1]; 
return 0; 
} 
v o i d m u l t i p l y M a t r i c e s ( u n s i g n e d char* A , unsigned char* B, unsigned char* result) { 
u n s i g n e d long i, j, k; 
for (i=0 ； K g N o O f B u n d l e s ； i++) { 
for(j =0;j <gNoOfBundles；j ++) { 
result[i*gNoOfBundles+j] = 0; 
for(k=0；k<gNoOfBundles；k++) { 
if(A[i*gNoOfBundles+k]！=0 && B[k*gNoOfBundles+j]！=0) 







int checkDiagonal(unsigned char* aMatrix) ( 
unsigned long i ; 








Program Listing of the Relationship Matrix Algorithm (Modified 1) 
# i n c l u d e < i o s t r e a m . h > 
# i n c l u d e < f s t r e a m . h > 
# i n c l u d e < t i m e . h > 
u n s i g n e d long gNoOfConunod; 
u n s i g n e d long gNoOfBundles; 
d o u b l e • g D a t a M a t r i x ; 
u n s i g n e d char *gRelationMatrix; 
i n t r e a d F i l e ( c o n s t char* filename); 
int c r e a t e R e l a t i o n M a t r i x ( ) ; 
d o u b l e p r i c e D o t B u n d l e ( u n s i g n e d long pricelndex, unsigned long b u n d l e l n d e x ) ; 
int c h e c k L o o p ( ) ; 
i n t s q u a r e M a t r i x ( u n s i g n e d char* A , unsigned char* result); 
i n t m a i n ( i n t argc, const char *argv[]) { 
int c h e c k R e s u l t = 0; 
c l o c k _ t StartTime, endTime; 
S t a r t T i m e = clock(); 
i f ( a r g c < = l )【 
cerr « "Usage: “ « argv[0] « “ datafile" « endl; 
return 1; 
} 
i f ( r e a d F i l e ( a r g v [ l ] ) ) { 
return 1; 
) 
i f ( c r e a t e R e l a t i o n M a t r i x ( ) ) { 
return 1; 
} 
d e l e t e [] g D a t a M a t r i x ; 
c h e c k R e s u l t = c h e c k L o o p ( ) ; 
if (chec)cResult==l) { 
cout « "SARP is not satisfied for this set of data." « endl; 
) e l s e i f ( c h e c k R e s u l t = = 0 ) { 
c o u t « "SARP is satisfied for this set of data." « endl; 
} else { 
d e l e t e [] g R e l a t i o n M a t r i x ; 
return 1; 
} 
d e l e t e [] g R e l a t i o n M a t r i x ; 
e n d T i m e = clock()/ 
c o u t « "Elasped time = “ « (double)(endTime - startTime)/CLOCKS_PER_SEC 
<< “seconds.“ << endl; 
r e t u r n 0; 
} 
int readFile(const char* filename) { 
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char a C h a r ; 
u n s i g n e d long n o O f C o l s = 0; 
u n s i g n e d long n o O f R o w s = 0; 
i f s t r e a m d a t a F i l e ( f i l e n a m e )； 
u n s i g n e d long i = 0; 
i f ( d a t a F i l e . f a i l 0 ) { 
cerr << " C a n n o t o p e n file, m a k e sure that the file name is c o r r e c t 
and it is n o t u s e d b y a n o t h e r program.“ « endl; 
r e t u r n 1; 
) 
w h i l e ( d a t a F i l e . p e e k ( > ! = E O F ) { 
d a t a F i l e . g e t ( a C h a r ) ; 
i f ( a C h a r = = ' \ t ' ) { 
n o O f C o l s + + ; 
) e l s e i f ( a C h a r = = ' \ n ' ) { 
noOfCols++； 
noOfRows++/ 
b r e a k ; 
} 
) 
i f ( n o O f C o l s = = 0 11 n o O f C o l s / 2 * 2 ！= noOfCols) { 
cerr « " I n v a l i d file format, the number of p r i c e s and the n u m b e r 
of c o m m o d i t i e s are n o t the same." « endl; 
r e t u r n 1; 
} 
while(dataFile.peek()！=EOF) { 
d a t a F i l e • g e t ( a C h a r ) ; 
i f ( a C h a r = = ' \ n ' ) { 
n o O f R o w s + + ; 
1 
} 
i f ( a C h a r ! = ' \ n ' ) { 
noOfRows++； 
1 
i f ( n o O f R o w s = = l ) { 
cerr « " I n v a l i d file format, there is only one p r i c e p u r c h a s e 
data.“ « e n d l ; 
r e t u r n 1; 
) 
g N o O f B u n d l e s = n o O f R o w s ; 
g N o O f C o m m o d = n o O f C o l s / 2 ; 
/ * 
do { 
c o u t « "There are “ « g N o O f B u n d l e s « “ pri c e p u r c h a s e data w i t h 
“ < < gNoOfConunod « “ c o m m o d i t i e s , p r o c e e d ? [ y / n ] " ; 
c i n » a C h a r ; 
) w h i l e ( a C h a r ! = ' y ' && a C h a r ! = ' Y ' && a C h a r ! = ' n ' && a C h a r ! = ' N ' ) ; 
i f ( a C h a r = = ' n , U a C h a r = = ' N i ) ( 
r e t u r n 1; 
) 
* / 
g D a t a M a t r i x = n e w d o u b l e [ n o O f R o w s * n o O f C o l s ]； 
i f ( ! g D a t a M a t r i x ) { 
cerr « " C a n n o t a l l o c a t e m e m o r y " « endl; 





while(！dataFile.eof() S& i<noOfRows*noOfCols) { 
dataFile >> gDataMatrix[i]; 
i++； 
) 
i f ( i<noOfRows*noOfCo ls ) { 
cerr « "Invalid file format, it must be a tab delimited text file 
w i t h each line representing a price purchase data, the first n numbers m u s t be the 





i n t c r e a t e R e l a t i o n M a t r i x ( ) { 
unsigned long i, j; 
double income; 
gRe la t i onMatr ix = new unsigned char[gNoOfBundles*gNoOfBundles] ; 
i f (！gRe la t i onMatr ix ) { 
cerr « "Cannot allocate memory" « endl; 
return 1; 
} 
f o r { i = 0 / i < g N o O f B u n d l e s ; i + + ) { 
income = priceDotBundle(i,i); 
for(j =0;j <gNoOfBundles；j ++) { 
if(i==j) { 
gRelationMatrix[i*gNoOfBundles+j] = 1; 
} else { 
if(income >= p r i c e D o t B u n d l e ( i , j ) ) ( 
gRelationMatrix[i*gNoOfBundles+j] = 1; 
} else { 







d o u b l e p r i c eDotBund le (uns igned l ong p r i c e l n d e x , unsigned long bundle lndex) { 
u n s i g n e d long i; 
d o u b l e returnValue = 0; 
for (i=0 ； K g N o O f C o m m o d ; i++) { 
returnValue += gDataMatrix[priceIndex*gNoOfCommod*2 + i] * 




i n t checkLoop ( ) { 
u n s i g n e d char *tempMatrix[2]; 
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unsigned long index = 0; 
unsigned long power = 1; 
tempMatrix[0] = gRelationMatrix; 
tempMatrix[l] = new unsigned char[gNoOfBundles*gNoOfBundles]; 
if{!tempMatrix[1]) { 








power *= 2; 
) 
delete [] tempMatrix[1]; 
return 0; 
} 
int squareMatrix(unsigned char* A , unsigned char* result) { 
unsigned long i, j, k; 
for (i=0 ； K g N o O f B u n d l e s ; i++) { 
for(j =0;j <gNoOfBundles；j ++) { 




A[k * g N o O f B u n d l e s + j ] ! = 0 ) { 




) e l s e { 
for (k=0 ； k<gNoOfBundles ； k:++) { 
result[i*gNoOfBundles+j] += 
A [ i * g N o O f B u n d l e s + k ] *A[lc*gNoOfBundles+j ]; 










Program Listing of the Depth First Search Algorithm 
# i n c l u d e < i o s t r e a m . h > 
# i n c l u d e < f s t r e a m . h > 
# i n c l u d e < t i m e . h > 
u n s i g n e d long g N o O f C o m m o d ; 
u n s i g n e d long g N o O f B u n d l e s ; 
d o u b l e * g D a t a M a t r i x ; 
u n s i g n e d long* gParent; 
u n s i g n e d long g L o o p R o o t ; 
i n t r e a d F i l e ( c o n s t char* f i l e n a m e ) ; 
d o u b l e p r i c e D o t B u n d l e ( u n s i g n e d long p r i c e l n d e x , unsigned long b u n d l e l n d e x ) 7 
i n t c h e c k L o o p ( ) ; 
i n t m a i n ( i n t a r g c , c o n s t char *argv[]) { 
u n s i g n e d long i; 
int c h e c k R e s u l t = 0; 
clock一t s t a r t T i m e , e n d T i m e ; 
s t a r t T i m e = c l o c k ( ) ; 
i f ( a r g c < = l ) { 
cerr « "Usage: “ « argv[0] « “ datafile" « endl; 
r e t u r n 1; 
) 
i f ( r e a d F i l e ( a r g v [ l ] ) ) { 
r e t u r n 1; 
) 
C h e c k R e s u l t = c h e c k L o o p ( ) ; 
if (checlcResult==l) { 
c o u t « "SARP is n o t s a t i s f i e d for this set of data A n " « endl; 
c o u t « g L o o p R o o t « “ < “； 
i = g P a r e n t [ g L o o p R o o t ]； 
w h i l e ( i ！= g L o o p R o o t ) { 
c o u t « i « " < "; 
i = g P a r e n t [ i ] ; 
) 
c o u t « i « endl; 
) e l s e i f ( c h e c k R e s u l t = = 0 ) { 
c o u t « "SARP is s a t i s f i e d for this set of data." « endl; 
) e l s e { 
d e l e t e [] g D a t a M a t r i x ; 
d e l e t e [] g P a r e n t ; 
r e t u r n 1; 
} 
d e l e t e [] g D a t a M a t r i x ; 
d e l e t e [] g P a r e n t ; 
e n d T i m e = c l o c k ( ) ; 
c o u t « " E l a s p e d time = “ « (double) (endTime - startTime) /CLOCKS_PER_SEC 




int readFile(const char* filename) { 
char aChar; 
unsigned long noOfCols = 0; 
unsigned long noOfRows = 0; 
ifstream dataFile(filename); 
unsigned long i = 0; 
i f ( d a t a F i l e . f a i l⑴ { 
cerr << "Cannot open file, make sure that the file name is c o r r e c t 
and it is not used by another program.“ « endl; 
return 1; 
) 










if(no0fcols==0 11 noOfCols/2*2 ！= noOfCols) { 
cerr « "Invalid file format, the number of prices and the number 
of commodities are not the same." « endl; 
return 1; 
} 










cerr « "Invalid file format, there is only one price purchase 
data." « endl; 
return 1; 
} 
gNoOfBundles = noOfRows; 
gNoOfCommod = noOfCols/2; 
/ * 
do { 
cout « "There are “ « gNoOfBundles « “ price purchase data with 
“<< g N o O f C o m m o d « “ commodities, proceed? [y/n]“ << endl; 
cin » aChar; 
) w h i l e ( a C h a r ! = ' y ' && aChar!='Y' && aChar!='n' && aChar!=iN'); 





gDataMatrix = new double[noOfRows*noOfCols]; 
if(！gDataMatrix) { 
cerr « "Cannot allocate memory" << end丄； 
return 1; 
) 
d a t a F i l e . c l o s e O ; 
dataFile.open(filename); 
while ( ！ d a t a F i l e . eof () && K n o O f R o w s * n o O f C o l s ) ( 




cerr << "Invalid file format, it must be a tab delimited text file 
w i t h each line representing a price purchase data, the first n numbers m u s t be the 





int checkLoop() { 
unsigned char flagPath = 1; 
unsigned char flagChecked = 2; 
u n s i g n e d char* flags; 
unsigned long i, j； 
unsigned long checkedNo = 0; 
double income; 
flags = n e w unsigned char[gNoOfBundles]; 
if(!flags) { 
cerr « "Cannot allocate memory" « endl; 
return -1; 
) 
g P a r e n t = new unsigned long[gNoOfBundles]； 
if(!gParent) { 
cerr « "Cannot allocate memory" « endl; 
delete [] flags; 
return -1; 
) 
f o r ( i = 0 ; i < g N o O f B u n d l e s / i + + ) ( 
flags[i] = 0; 
gParent[i] = 0; 
) 
w h i l e ( c h e c k e d N o < g N o O f B u n d l e s ) ( 
for (i=0； K g N o O f B u n d l e s ； i++) { 
if(！(flags[i] & flagChecked)) { 





flags[i] 1= flagPath; 
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income = priceDotBundle(i,i); 
f o r ( j = 0 ; j < g N o O f B u n d l e s ; j + + ) ( 




gParent[j] = i; 
if(flags[j] & flagPath) { 








flags[i] 1= flagChecked; 
checkedNo++; 




delete [] flags; 
r e t u r n 0; 
) 
d o u b l e p r i c e D o t B u n d l e ( u n s i g n e d long pricelndex, unsigned long bundlelndex) { 
u n s i g n e d long i; 
d o u b l e r e t u r n V a l u e = 0; 
for (i=0;i<gNoOfCoiratiod;i++) { 
r e t u r n V a l u e += gDataMatrix[priceIndex*gNoOfCoinmod*2 + i] * 
g D a t a M a t r i x [ b u n d l e I n d e x * g N o O f C o m m o d * 2 + gNoOfCommod + i]; 
} 
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